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Sheila Wildeman*

Agonizing Identity in Mental Health Law and
Policy (Part II): A Political Taxonomy of
Psychiatric Subjectification

This is the second part of a two-part essay exploring the function of identity in
mental health law and policy or more broadly the function of identity in the politics
of mental health. Part one began with the Foucauldian exhortation to undertake a
"critical ontology of ourselves," and adopted the methodology of autoethnography
to explore the construction or constructedness of the authors identity as an expert
working in the area of mental health law and policy. That part concluded with a
gesture of resistance to identification on one or the other side of the mental health/
illness divide (the divide of reason and madness), affirming instead an aspiration
to carve out a space of contemplation-or rather multiple spaces: fleeting,
episodic manifestations of what the author terms "spectral identity"-supportive
of reflection on the relational determinants of one's position along a continuum of
shared vulnerabilities and capacities, shifting over time and across bio-psychosocial settings in defiance of simplistic binary categories. Part two builds out from
these insights toward a political taxonomy of mental health identities. As such
it deepens its engagement with the core question raised in part one: namely is
"mentalhealth" working on us-on the mental health disabled, legal scholars, all
of us-in ways that are impairing our capacity for social justice?

-

Cet article est le second volet d'un essai en deux parties qui examine la fonction
de l'identit6 en droit et en politique de la sant6 mentale ou, plus largement, la
fonction de I'identit6 dans les politiques sur la sant6 mentale. Le premier volet
commence avec Iexhortation de Foucault qui nous incite a entreprendre une
<< ontologie critique de nous-m~mes. > Le texte suit alors la mdthode de I'autoethnographie pour 6tudier la construction ou I'aspect construit de I'identit6 de
'auteure en tant que spdcialiste travaillant dans le domaine du droit et de la
politique de la sant6 malade. Le volet se conclut sur un geste de resistance a
I'identification a Iun ou a Iautre cdtd de la sant6 mentale ou du foss6 cr66 par la
maladie (la frontiere entre raison et folie), affirmant plutdt une aspiration a crder
un espace de contemplation-ou plutdt des espaces multiples : manifestations
6phbmeres, 6pisodiques de ce que Iauteurequalifie d'<< identitds spectrales
qui 6tayent la rdflexion sur les determinants relationnels de la position de la
personne sur un continuum de vulndrabilitbs et de capacitds partagdes, qui
fluctuent au fil du temps et en fonction des contextes bio-psycho-sociaux, defiant
les categories binaires simplistes. Le second volet prend ces elements comme
points de depart vers une taxonomie politique des identitds en sant6 mentale.
Ce faisant, il approfondit Iexamen de la question fondamentale soulev~e dans le
premier volet : la sant6 mentale nous influence-t-elle-les handicapds mentaux,
les juristes, nous tous - de fagons qui nuisent a notre capacit6 de justice sociale?

*
Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University, Halifax. Thanks again to the participants in the
Identity Workshop at the Schulich School of Law in the fall of 2014, and special thanks to Kim Brooks
for organizing the workshop, and for her excellent editorial assistance. Thanks also, again, to the two
anonymous reviewers.
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Introduction
In Part I of this two-part essay, published in the second issue of volume 38
of the DalhousieLaw Journal,I started with a puzzle inherited from Michel
Foucault: namely, how to make sense (in practical and in normative terms)
of the imperative that we undertake the "critical ontology of ourselves"'-

1.
See Part I of this essay (Sheila Wildeman, "Agonizing Identity in Mental Health Law and Policy
(Part I)" (2015) 38:2 Dal U 619 at 620-621 ["Part I"]); Michel Foucault, "What is Enlightenment?"
in Paul Rabinow & Nikolas Rose, eds, The Essential Foucault: Selectionsfrom The Essential Works

ofFoucault, 1954-1984, translated by Catherine Porter (amended) (New York: New Press, 1994) 43
at 56.
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in the thick of biopower?2 How, that is, are we to understand the work of
radically emancipatory politics once we accept that our deep experiences
of identity or self-understanding are themselves imbricated in categories
of knowledge and techniques of social ordering expressive of the dominant
norms of our political culture-in particular, norms bringing together the
individualizing and responsibilizing ethic of neo-liberal political economy
with the rapidly-expanding universe of "ways of being mad" 3 ? Part I
adopted the method of autoethnography to broach these questions, or more
specifically, to commence an inquiry into the role of identity in mental
health law, policy, and politics. 4 The idea was to start with reflection on
my own role in or relationship to this field of law and politics, both as
expert and as a target for identification, before taking up the coordinate
identity positions of others. Part I concluded with a gesture of resistance
to identification on one or the other side of the mental health/illness divide
(the divide of reason and madness), affirming instead an aspiration to
carve out a space of contemplation-or rather multiple spaces: fleeting,
episodic manifestations of what I termed "spectral identity"- supportive
of reflection on the messy relational determinants of one's position along
a continuum of shared vulnerabilities and capacities, shifting over time
and across bio-psycho-social settings in defiance of simplistic binary
categories.
In what follows, I seek to make good on the aspiration stated in Part
I to move beyond the theoretical frame of critical or historical ontology
(a mode of critique rooted in the efforts of the solitary scholar) to the
collectivist ethic of radically pluralist democratic deliberation. I introduced
this aspiration in Part I with reference to Chantal Mouffe's "agonistic
pluralism"': a species of radical democratic politics enacting a hyperawareness of constitutive exclusion even or especially in the consolidation
of group-based identity. Part II takes this idea further, focusing on the

2.
On biopower, see Paul Rabinow & Nikolas Rose, "Thoughts on the Concept of Biopower
Today" (presentation, last revised in 2003), online: <www.1se.ac.uk/sociology/pdf/RabinowandRoseBiopowerToday03.pdf>, abstract [Rabinow & Rose, "Thoughts onBiopower Today"]; the presentation
was later revised and published as Paul Rabinow & Nikolas Rose, "Biopower Today" (2006) 1
Biosocieties 195. Rabinow and Rose elaborate upon this Foucauldian term as follows: "Biopower,
we suggest, entails one or more truth discourses about the 'vital' character of living human beings;
an array of authorities considered competent to speak that truth; strategies for intervention upon
collective existence in the name of life and health; and modes of subjectification, in which individuals
work on themselves in the name of individual or collective life or health"
3.
See the discussion of lan Hacking's work in "Part I," supra note 1 at 622-624.
4.
On alternative readings of the indeterminate domain of mental health law and policy, see
"Part I," supra note 1 at 624-627.
5.
See "Part I," supra note 1 at 628; Chantal Mouffe, "For an Agonistic Model of Democracy" in
Chantal Mouffe, The DemocraticParadox (New York: Verso, 2005) 80.
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meaning or function of constitutive exclusion as it plays out in the arenas
of mental health law and policy. Once again, my point of departure is
Foucault: now, his reflections on the constitution of madness in his History
of Madness.6 I then turn to identity constitution in the contemporary
politics of mental health, viewed from my vantage as a legal academic in
Nova Scotia. Specifically, I offer what I am calling a political taxonomy
of psychiatric subjectification-a classificatory scheme that is necessarily
flawed and partial, and based in a certain amount of interpretive violence.
I distinguish three major categories of social positioning in describing
those who stand as the subjects of mental health law and policy. These are:
(1) radicalized psy-subjects (including users and survivors of psychiatry,
Mad Pride and antipsychiatry); (2) psychiatric consumers (including both
politically visible and politically invisible consumers, united by a focus on
the quality and accessibility of individualized mental health services and
accommodations); and (3) liminal subjects (including the "suggestible,"
or those at the threshold of self-understanding/self-discipline in light of
the categories of psychiatric knowledge, and the "spectral," describing a
transitory state latent within each of us wherein "mental health identity"
may be contemplated in light of its historical and material bases and yet
appreciated as lacking in substance, as phantasmic).
In exploring these categories, I reflect on the complex and variable
function of identity in the politics of mental health. In particular, I ask what
if any resonance the now-familiar critiques of identity politics have for
this politics-i.e., concerns that identity-based social justice claims may
paradoxically reify the ideological constructs through which dominant
and subordinate subject positions are legitimized, may flatten or deny
diversity of experience within the putative group, and may obstruct more
far-reaching forms of social justice critique, including efforts at coalition
building, in favour of a highly localized micro-politics. I conclude by
canvassing voices from the radical politics of mental health that I take
to exemplify the radical democratic ethic of agonistic pluralism: voices
advancing new ways of troubling "mental health identity" so as to open
the claims of the social justice movement of resistance to psychiatric
subjectification to a refreshed plurality of critical perspectives.

&

6.
Michel Foucault, History of Madness, ed by Jean Khalfa, translated by Jonathan Murphy
Jean Khalfa (New York: Routledge, 2006) [Foucault, History ofMadness], first published as Michel
Foucault, Folie et deraison:Histoirede lafolie a ldge classique (Paris: Plon, 1961).
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The constitution of madness
[T]he constitution of madness as mental illness, at the end of the
eighteenth century, bears witness to a rupture in a dialogue, gives the
separation as already enacted, and expels from the memory all those
imperfect words, of no fixed syntax, spoken falteringly, in which the
exchange between madness and reason was carried out. The language
of psychiatry, which is a monologue by reason about madness, has been
established only on the basis of such a silence.

Foucault's exploration of the constitution of madness in his early
work, the History of Madness,' traces a set of shifting institutional and
discursive expressions of the distinction between reason and madness
across successive theories and techniques of confinement and control. At
the heart of the History is the idea of constitutive exclusion: of reason
defining or asserting itself (in the form of psychiatric knowledge) through
the suppression or silencing of its other. Foucault's method, recognizable
as critical ontology, involves tracing the shape (or archeology) of
constitutive exclusion through its institutional effects. This is an approach
that is adopted, in the History, with the express aim of revealing the
contingency of contemporary practices of objectifying and pathologizing
the psychiatric subject.9
Foucault indicates, in the first iteration of his Preface to the History,
his intent to write "a history of that other trick that madness plays.""o
This recalls an introductory epigram supplied from Pascal: "Men are so
necessarily mad, that not being mad would be being mad through another
trick that madness played."n Pascal invokes (in)sanity's catch-22, the
doubled logic whereby self-perception as sane signifies failed insight
into madness. The aim of Foucault's History is to dwell upon and expose
the deep logic productive of madness, "through which men, in the
gesture of sovereign reason that locks up their neighbour, communicate
7.
Foucault, History ofMadness, supra note 6 at xxviii (from Foucault's Preface to the 1961
Edition) [emphasis in original].
8.

Foucault, History ofMadness, supra note 6.

9.
Amy Allen, "Feminism, Foucault, and the Critique of Reason: Re-reading the History of
Madness" (2013) 16 Foucault Studies 15 at 28-29. Allen writes:
The critique of reason elaborated in the History ofMadness thus does not reject reason
nor does it counsel an embrace of madness or unreason as the space of freedom. Rather, in
the History ofMadness, Foucault implicitly relies on the same conception of critique that
he defends more explicitly in his later work, where reason is understood in fundamentally
ambivalent terms and where freedom consists in opening up a space between ourselves and
our historical a priori.
10. Foucault, History of Madness, supra note 6 at xxvii (from Foucault's Preface to the 1961
Edition).
11.

Ibid.
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and recognise each other in the merciless language of non-madness."12
Foucault elaborates:
[W]e need to identify the moment of that expulsion, before it was
definitively established in the reign of truth, before it was brought back
to life by the lyricism of protestation. To try to recapture, in history,
this degree zero of the history of madness, when it was undifferentiated
experience, the still undivided experience of the division itself. To
describe, from the origin of its curve, that 'other trick' which, on either
side of its movement, allows Reason and Madness to fall away, like
things henceforth foreign to each other, deaf to any exchange, almost
dead to each other.' 3
There is amessianic registertothis statementthatis less evident in Foucault's
later excurses into governmentality (and "biopolitics")," wherein even our
freedom is an effect of power. Taken in context," the claim is not that
we might, through attention to psychiatry's "discourses, institutions and
practices," 16 see our way back to an undifferentiated conceptual origin
or otherwise forge a future in which constitutive exclusion may be fully
repaired or overcome. Rather, the project of exposing the historically
contingent conditions through which some are rendered objects of study
while others ("experts" or as Nikolas Rose puts it, "psy-experts"") craft
monologues of reason aims to produce a heightened awareness of the

12.
13.
14.

Ibid.
Ibid.
See Rabinow & Rose, "Thoughts on Biopower Today," supra note 2 at 3. The authors state:
"within the field of biopower, we can call 'biopolitics' the specific strategies and
contestations over problematizations of collective human vitality, morbidity and mortality,
over the forms of knowledge, regimes of authority, and practices of intervention that are
desirable, legitimate and efficacious."
15. Foucault's will to put a brake on the romantic appeal to recovering lost origins is apparent just a
few lines on in the Preface to the 1961 Edition:
We must therefore speak of this primitive debate without supposing a victory, nor the
right to victory; we must speak of these repeated gestures in history, leaving in suspense
anything that might take on the appearance of an ending, or of rest in truth and speak of
that gesture of severance, the distance taken, the void installed between reason and that
which it is not, without ever leaning on the plenitude of what reason pretends to be."
(Foucault, History ofMadness, supra note 6 at xxviii).

16.

"Reply to Derrida," Appendix III in Foucault, History ofMadness, supra note 6, 575 at 578.

17.

See Nikolas Rose, Inventing Ourselves: Psychology, Power and Personhood (Cambridge, UK:

Cambridge University Press, 1996) at 2:
The psychosciences and disciplines-psychology, psychiatry, and their cognates-form
the focus of these studies. Collectively I refer to the ways of thinking and acting brought
into existence by these disciplines since the last half of the nineteenth century as 'psy,' not
because they form a monolithic or coherent bloc-quite the reverse-but because they
have brought into existence a variety of new ways in which human beings have come to
understand themselves and do things to themselves.
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silence conditioning the possibility of psy-knowledge-an awareness that
may give rise to new questions.
Indeed, for all this talk of silence, the History ofMadness registers the
passionate stirrings of a new discourse. In the passage quoted, Foucault
elegiacally invokes a moment in the process productive of the divide
between reason and madness "before it was definitively established in
the reign of truth, before it was brought back to life by the lyricism of
protestation.""8 The latter phrase resonates with the social movement
of resistance to psychiatry coming to new prominence at the time of
Foucault's History-a resistance movement presented, in the passage
cited, as functioning to revive or reinforce (as it were, from the other
side) the distinction between reason and madness that the History seeks
to disrupt.
The fifty years since Foucault's first major work was published have
been marked by a proliferation of public discourse and forms of social
positionality centring in the psychiatric subject. Indeed, as literary critic
Shoshana Felman has suggested, by the latter part of the 20th century, the
project of exploring the constitution of madness had become less a matter
of coaxing an historical narrative out of constitutive silence than organizing
or discerning the distinctive discursive logics and social functions of a
dizzying profusion of competing stories.1 9 Felman focuses on fictional
texts, arguing that literature is itself "mad" in its capacity to expose the
constitutive exclusions (or forms of "unreason") grounding the project of
social ordering. 20 A complementary development since Foucault's History
has been the forging of new critical histories providing a corrective to
Foucault's rather loose (to put it kindly) historiography. For instance,
British social historian Roy Porter and Canadian Mad Studies historian
Geoffery Reaume have opened rich passages in the history of madness by
excavating the narratives of psychiatric subjects at specific institutional

18.

Foucault, History ofMadness, supra note 6 at xxvii.

19. Shoshana Felman, Writing and Madness, translated by Martha Noel Evans et al (Palo Alto:
Stanford University Press, 2003) at 12-14, 17; Writing andMadness, which was originally published
in 1985, is an abridged translation of Shoshana Felman, Lafolie et la chose litteraire (Paris: Seuil,
1978).
20.

Felman, Writing and Madness, supra note 19 at 5.
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sites.2 1 Such assemblages of traces of agency and resistance from within
the structures and institutions of psychiatric confinement offer alternative
histories on which to ground an alternative present.
From the vantage of politics, the most important development in the
history of madness has been the rise of first voice interventions (selfidentifying through the experience of madness or psychiatric intervention
or both) in public deliberations on the meaning of and the appropriate
or legitimate social responses to madness/mental illness/mental or
psychosocial disability. The question that arises on encountering this dense
field of voices is not "what would madness say if it could speak?" (this
was never really Foucault's question), but rather, "what is the function,
the normative and political relevance, of the jostling claims to politically
salient identity in the politics of mental health?"
II. Toward a political taxonomy ofpsychiatric subjectification
Foucault writes, in the preface to his next major work, The Order ofThings:
This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that
shattered, as I read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of thoughtour thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age and our
geography-breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with
which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things
and continuing long afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our
age-old definitions between the Same and the Other.22
The passage from Borges to which Foucault refers invokes an ancient
Chinese encyclopedia (Borges's invention, it seems), the Celestial
Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge,23 which sought to class all manner
of things according to universal conceptual schema. For example, Borges
recounts, the Emporium sorted "animals" into fourteen categories,
including "those belonging to the emperor," "embalmed ones," "those that

21. See e.g. Roy Porter, A Social History of Madness: The World through the Eyes of the Insane
(New York: Dutton, 1989); Roy Porter, Mind-Forg'dManacles: A History of Madness in England

from the Restoration to the Regency (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987). Geoffrey
Reaume, Remembrance of PatientsPast: Patient Life at the Toronto Hospitalfor the Insane, 1870-

1940 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000). See e.g. Ian Hacking, Mad Travelers: Reflections
on the Reality of TransientMental Illness, (Charlottesville, VA: Virginia University Press, 1998); lan
Hacking, Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences ofMemory (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1995).
22. Michel Foucault, The Order ofThings: An Archaeology ofHuman Sciences (New York: Vintage,
1994) at xv.
23. Jorge Luis Borges, "The Analytical Language of John Wilkins" in Jorge Luis Borges, Other
Inquisitions1937-1952, translated by Ruth LC Simms (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1964)
101 at 103, alternative translation available online: <www.crockford.com/wrrrld/wilkins.html>.
Thanks to the anonymous reviewer who suggested I consider drawing on Borges's invention.
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are trained," "stray dogs," "those included in this classification," "those
drawn with a very fine camel hair brush," etc. (the twelfth category is
indeed "et cetera").2 4
Foucault's laughter on encountering Borges's Emporium signifies
the purpose and method of critical ontology: the disruption of habitual,
habituated analytical schemes through which we understand ourselves
and others and the worlds we inhabit. The categories posited in the
political taxonomy that follows are offered in a similar spirit. That is, I
acknowledge the folly of attempting to fix determinative categories of
social positionality in the politics of mental health, even as I seek thereby
to open the question of the function of identity in this politics. The point
is to spur reflection about whether (or in what contexts) politicized mental
health identification may disrupt or alternatively reinforce the deep binary
logic of reason and madness whereby the subordinate term is violently
translated from the status of full legal and political subject to the status of
manipulable object. As we move into the domain of taxonomy (framed as
a taxonomy of "psychiatric subjectification," to foreground the way power
works on and through the subject in the form of "mental health identity"),
then, it is important to keep in mind not merely the arbitrariness but the
violence of our habits of classification in this and other fields. At some
point, that is to say, the laughter stops, as we contemplate the calculating,
punishing logics of exclusion and subordination that over time ossify in
our minds and institutions.
The rough organizing principle in what follows is to move from selfconsciously radical or oppositional subject positions in the politics of
mental health (the class of radicalized psy-subjects), through positions
more clearly co-opted by dominant logics (the class of mental health
consumers), before concluding with what I term liminal subjects (divided
into the suggestible and the spectral: the one signifying the potential for
psychiatric subjectification latent within the as yet unidentified, and the
other, the possibility of critically interrogating one's own and others'
identity-based allegiances). I leave for another day, or for a further
installment in my political taxonomy, the politics of family and of familyaligned organizations, which in recent decades have functioned to drive
mental health law reforms in the direction of increased tolerance for
coercion or force. This is perhaps chief among the constitutive exclusions
informing the fashioning of my taxonomy.

24. I prefer and so have adopted the translation of the Emporium's categories featured in the
Wikipedia entry: Wikipedia, "Celestial Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge," online: <enwikipedia.
org/wiki/Celestial Emporium of BenevolentKnowledge>.

156

1.

The Dalhousie Law Journal

Radicalizedpsy-subjects

a. Challengingdescriptors
The first entry in my taxonomy, the class of radicalized psy-subjects,
is united in resistance to the deployment of psychiatric knowledge to
translate legal subjects into passive objects of manipulation and control.
However, this broad class is marked by distinct sub-groupings adopting
diverse critical analyses and strategies. Assistance in gaining onentation to
the field is found in the critical ethnographic work of Shaindl Diamond,2 5
which illuminates the vibrant complexity of the contemporary social
movement(s) of resistance to psychiatry in Toronto.2 6 Diamond's research
identifies at least three distinct (and in some respects overlapping) subgroupings of resistant psy-subjects.
The first is the psychiatric survivor constituency.2 7 Diamond describes
this as "the heart of the political community, representing those who
are most deeply affected by the practice of biological psychiatry and
sanism in dominant culture."28 Survivors unite around "peer support
and consciousness-raising initiatives" aimed at individual and collective
empowerment. By foregrounding the experience and self-understanding
of those targeted and defined by psychiatric knowledge, survivors subvert
the dominant norms of the mental health system. Particular attention is
given to exposing the illegitimacy of involuntary psychiatric interventions
through survivor narratives relaying the experience of such interventions
as raw or unmitigated violence. Yet while the survivor movement is
deeply critical of psychiatry and particularly coercive psychiatry, some
self-identified survivors are also users of the mental health system and
participants in mental health system reform processes (thus standing in
tension with antipsychiatry, described below).2 9 Ultimately, the survivor
perspective brings the liberty-centric analysis of opposition to forced
interventions together with an antidiscrimination analysis seeking to

25. Shaindl Diamond, "What Makes Us a Community? Reflection on Building Solidarity in AntiSanist Praxis" in Brenda A LeFrangois, Robert Menzies & Geoffrey Reaume, eds, Mad Matters:A
CriticalReader in Canadian Mad Studies (Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 2013) [LeFrangois,

Menzies & Reaume, Mad Matters] 64 [Diamond, "Building Solidarity"].
26. Diamond conducted the research informing her essay between 2008-2010 (ibid at 78). For
more on Toronto's standing as a rich site of survivor / Mad activism and scholarship, see Psychiatric
Survivor Archives of Toronto, online: <www.psychiatricsurvivorarchives.com>; Toronto Mad Pride,

online: <www.torontomadpride.com>.
27. Prominent international psychiatric survivor (or user/survivor) groups include MindFreedom,
online: <www.mindfreedom.org> and the World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry
(WNUSP), online: <www.wnusp.net>.

28.
29.

Diamond, "Building Solidarity," supra note 25 at 65.
Ibidat65,68.
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counter social exclusion through such means as "accessible survivorpositive employment opportunities, affordable housing options, and other
non-psychiatric alternatives."3
Next is the "Mad constituency."3 1 Those identifying as Mad
express a commitment to affirming or revaluing forms of identity and
experience susceptible to medical surveillance and correction-as such, to
"developing Mad culture" or Mad Pride.3 2 This, according to Diamond, is
"a newer phenomemon [... which] evolved out of the psychiatric survivor
constituency, and in many ways can be viewed as an extension of it." 3 3 The
main difference between Mad Pride and the survivor movement consists
in a "shift from focusing on psychiatric oppression to the development
of positive understandings of Mad identity and experience."3 4 Diamond
suggests that some members of this constituency rely upon essentialized
or naturalized understandings of madness (paired with a critique based in
the duty to accommodate difference), while others take the view that Mad
culture and Mad critique may be shared in by all who identify "normal" as
an oppressive social construct.3 5
The final major sub-grouping of resistant psy-subjects identified in
Diamond's critical ethnography is antipsychiatry.3 6 The core mandate of
this constituency-to end psychiatric coercion-overlaps in part with the
politics of the psychiatric survivor movement and Mad Pride. What is
distinct is that, on the analysis of antipsychiatry, psychiatric knowledge
and practice is necessarily coercive and is wholly lacking in scientific,
political, and legal legitimacy. The objective is thus not simply to reform
but to abolish psychiatry, or at least to sever its institutional roots from

30.
31.
32.
33.
and

Ibid at 65.
Ibid at 65-66.
Ibid at 66.
Ibid at 65. The complex relationships among the categories of consumer, survivor, ex-patient,
Mad Pride are taken up in Geoffrey Reaume, "A History of Psychiatric Survivor Pride Day,"

Consumer/Survivor Information Resource Centre Bulletin, bulletin 374 (14 July 2008) 2, online:

<www.csinfo.ca/bulletin/Bulletin_374.pdf>.
34. Diamond, "Building Solidarity," supranote 25 at 66. On the emergence of Mad Pride in Toronto,
see Helen Henderson, "Mad as Hell: Angry Activists Say Treatment for Mental Illness Is Too Often
More about the Pills than the Person," Toronto Star (10 March 2007), online: <www.thestar.com/
life/2007/03/10/mad as hell.html>.
35. Diamond, "Building Solidarity," supra note 25 at 69-71.
36. Diamond notes that "[e]xamples of antipsychiatry groups based in Toronto include the Ontario
Coalition Against Electroshock (1982-1987), Resistance Against Psychiatry (1989-present), and the
Coalition Against Psychiatric Assault (2003-present)" (ibid at 67). For an example of international
organizing, see The Antipsychiatry Coalition, online: <www.antipsychiatry.org> and for U.S.-focused
organizing, see The Law Project for Psychiatric Rights (PsychRights), online: <psychrights.org>.
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supportive state structures.7 Antipsychiatry is unapologetically single-

minded in this regard and rejects incremental reforms that might lend
an air of legitimacy to institutional psychiatry.
As indicated, there are important differences among the objectives
and resistance strategies of the above sub-categories of radicalized
mental health politics. These differences produce tensions around
whether or how a common mandate or a politically salient identity may
be forged in defiance of psychiatric coercion and social exclusion. For
example, Bonnie Burstow, a prominent Toronto-based antipsychiatry
theorist and activist, at once celebrates the shared aspirations of
antipsychiatry and Mad Pride in opposing psychiatric coercion and
warns against Mad Pride's strategy of "reclaiming" historically-derided
Mad (looney, crazy) identity categories, suggesting that this strategy is
highly susceptible to the recuperative forces of psychiatric hegemony
and so may in fact operate to reinforce the knowledge and practices on
which coercive psychiatry (or psychiatry as such) and related forms of
social exclusion are based.38 Antipsychiatry, Burstow suggests, resists
the cooptation that may result from grounding resistance to psychiatry
in shared mental health status, shared vulnerability to psychosocial
problems, or shared madness-instead resting solidarity on a common
set of ideological commitments.39 However, this non-identitarian stance
of antipsychiatry attracts suspicion among some of those who identify
as survivors or as Mad people." At the same time, it may be observed
that antipsychiatry shares with the survivor movement a privileging
of survivor narratives as a mechanism of consciousness-raising and
solidarity-building-a tactic that arguably tends to construct insider/
outsider knowledge and status in a manner that reflects a common
experiential base (that of subjection to psychiatric knowledge). In
constructing insider status along these lines, antipsychiatry, too, risks
paradoxically reinforcing (as it were, from the other side) the very
forms of knowledge and identity-construction critiqued.
37. Diamond, "Building Solidarity," supra note 25, at 66. See also Bonnie Burstow, "The
Withering Away of Psychiatry: An Attrition Model for Antipsychiatry" in Bonnie Burstow,
Brenda A LeFrangois & Shaindl Diamond, eds, PsychiatryDisrupted: TheorizingResistance and
Crafting the (R)evolution (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2014) 34 at 36.
38. See Bonnie Burstow, "A Rose by Any Other Name: Naming and the Battle against
Psychiatry" in LeFrangois, Menzies & Reaume, Mad Matters, supra note 25, 79 at 82-85
[Burstow, "Rose by Any Other Name"].
39. Ibid at 85; Diamond, "Building Solidarity," supra note 25 at 66-67, adds: "While the
perspectives of psychiatrized people are often placed front and centre, the [antipsychiatry]
constituency is open to all people who are interested in undermining psychiatric dominance and
includes both those who have been psychiatrized and those who have not."
40. Diamond, "Building Solidarity," supranote 25 at71-72.
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Efforts to unite the experiences and analyses of the various sub-groups
discussed are apparent in the conjoining of "consumer/survivor/ex-patient"
(c/s/x) perspectives"-or more narrowly (and more in keeping with my
taxonomy's distinguishing mental health consumers from radicalized psysubjects), "user and survivor" perspectives-in some advocacy strategies.
Consider, for example, the World Network of Users and Survivors of
Psychiatry (WNUSP). WNUSP raised its profile in recent years by
taking on a central role, in coordination with other Disabled Persons
Organizations, in the negotiation and drafting of the U.N. Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD).42 In conjoining distinct
user and survivor constituencies, this and other activist organizations
arguably shift radical psy-subject politics in important ways. For instance,
while the term "user" admits of a reading that would simply merge this
category with the self-directing neo-liberal "consumer," it arguably has
a mercenary quality that the "consumer" lacks; moreover, the "user" has
the potential to register as faintly corrupted or exploited by the system
used (as in "user of street drugs"). In any case, "users" are radicalized by
their proximity to "survivors"-those whose hard-won political insights
issue from withstanding psychiatry as one might a violent attack.4 3 At the
same time, "survivors" are cast in a new light by their willingness to join
political forces with those openly using psychiatric services. Of course,
one can be both a user and a survivor, as continuing use of the system can
be pervaded with the critical ambivalence borne of surviving its ongoing
oppressive effects.
WNUSP's membership criteria state that "user or survivor of
psychiatry" includes "anyone who defines themselves as a person who
has experienced madness and/or mental health problems and/or has used
or survived psychiatry/mental health services.""4 This is broad enough

41.

On the deployment of conjoined c/s/x identities in social movement advocacy, see Linda

Morrison, Talking Back to Psychiatry: The Psychiatric Consumer/Survivor/Ex-PatientMovement

(New York: Routledge, 2005). For a critique of the tendency to blur these distinct social and political
locations, see Burstow, "Rose by Any Other Name," supra note 38 at 87-88.
42. 24 January 2007, A/RES/61/106 [CRPD]. For a careful history of the user/survivor movement,
including the role of WNUSP in the CRPD negotiations, see Moosa Salie, "The Voice of the User/
Survivor" in Samuel 0 Okpaku, ed, Essentialsof GlobalMental Health (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2014) 63.
43. However, see Diamond, "Building Solidarity," supranote 25 at 68. As Diamond observes, while
the term "survivor" "originated with a radical critique of the psychiatric system," the meaning is
unstable and context-dependent, and "now many people who are not as radical embrace the term,
sometimes even attributing different meanings to it, such as the implication that one has survived
mental illness rather than the psychiatric system."
44. World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry, WNUSP Statutes, art 3.1, online: <www.
wnusp.net/index.php/wnusp-statutes.html>.
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to accommodate those who have had no interaction with psychiatry as
well as those who refuse to grant such interactions a role in their selfdescription. Such openness to self-identification disrupts the coherence of
this politics as a form of identity politics. At the same time, it signals a
skepticism about psychiatric knowledge and a commitment to alternative
ways of making sense ofthe experiences attracting psychiatric surveillance
and control, which are common to all radicalized psy-subject positions.
Of course, a further criterion of membership in WNUSP is support
for the organization's mission: namely, to advocate domestically and
internationally for the human rights of users and survivors and to achieve
representation for users and survivors in forums affecting their interests."
This mission functions as ballast to the lightness of the identity-based
membership criteria-although the stabilization, such as it is, runs both
ways, as the mission is ultimately grounded in promoting the common
interests of members.
All ofthe sub-groups of radicalized psy-subjects discussed advance the
objective of dismantling, if not the psychiatric apparatus as a whole, then
coercive psychiatry or state-backed involuntary psychiatric interventions.46
It is important to acknowledge the radicality of this objective, given the
robust presence of regimes of involuntary psychiatric hospitalization
and treatment in each province in Canada and internationally." Yet
the possibility of strengthening this radical politics by forming stable
alliances among the subgroups is troubled by their diverse analyses and
strategies, and, relatedly, by the question of whether or how their social
justice claims may be grounded in a politically salient shared identity.
These challenges have only deepened as the focus of social justice claimsmaking in the movement has shifted from a near-exclusive emphasis
on liberty or freedom from involuntary interventions to a coordinate
emphasis on equality or social inclusion. The question is how to negotiate
the expectation that discrimination claims be grounded in membership
in a vulnerable or derided group while maintaining space for resistance
45.

Ibid, art 2.2.

46.

European Network of (ex-)Users and Survivors ofPsychiatry et al, DeclarationofDresden against

Coerced Psychiatric Treatment, (2007), online: <www.wnusp.net/documents/dresdenDeclaration.

&

pdf> at 1. The Dresden Declaration, which reflects consensus among the European Network of (ex)
Users and Survivors of Psychiatry, WNUSP and MindFreedom International, suggests an attempt
to mediate the aspirations of abolitionists and those seeking abolition only of coercive practices:
"We stand united in calling for an end to all forced and coerced psychiatric procedures and for the
development of alternatives to psychiatry."
47. See Peter Carver, "Mental Health Law in Canada" in Jocelyn Downie, Timothy Caulfield
Colleen Flood, eds, Canadian Health Law and Policy, 3rd ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2007) 399; H
Archibald Kaiser, "Canadian Mental Health Law: The Slow Process of Redirecting the Ship of State"
(2009) 17 HealthLJ 139.
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to the categories of psychiatric knowledge through which the requisite
group identity is produced (whether under the heading of mental illness,
psychiatric disability, or even-though some argue this is severable from
psychiatric knowledge-psychosocial disability 8 ). I return to this question
below, in taking up how WNUSP has attempted to address this challenge.
b. Identity politics at the roots of radicalization
The tensions around identity within and among the radical psy-subject
constituencies cannot be fully appreciated without a sense of the historical
roots of the movement in identity politics. One important source of
momentum or consolidation in the early movement consisted in new
forms of social critique emerging in the late 1950s and 1960s, centring
in a critique of psychiatry. This included not only the work of Foucault,
but also that of Thomas Szasz, who denounced the state's collusion with
psychiatric power on the basis of libertarian arguments conjoining the right
to be free of state interference with a fierce ethic of personal responsibility
for how one's life goes.4 9 Also important was the work of R.D. Laing,
whose explorations of the phenomenology of psychic disturbance were
complemented by novel relational, community-based therapies." What
these disparate scholars shared, in terms oftheir relevance to the movement
for social justice on behalf of the psychiatrized, was the thesis that "mental
illness" was not a thing-in-itself or a dysfunction located in the individual

&

48. Bach and Kerzner position the term "psychosocial disability" as accommodating a variety of
forms of mental health identification, including "those who experience mental health issues, and/
or who identify as 'mental health consumers,' 'psychiatric survivors,' or 'mad."' Michael Bach
Lana Kerzner, A New Paradigmfor ProtectingAutonomy and the Right to Legal Capacity (Toronto:

Law Commission of Ontario, 2010) at 15, online: <www.lco-cdo.org/disabilities/bach-kerzner.pdf>.
The definition endorsed by WNUSP specifies that "psychosocial disability" does not signify "a belief
in psychosocial 'impairment."' World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry, "Psychosocial
Disability," online: <www.wnusp.net/documents/20 12/Psychosocial disability.docx>.
49.

See e.g. Thomas S Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal

Conduct, 2nd ed (New York: Harper & Row, 1974); Thomas S Szasz, The Manufacture ofMadness:
&

A Comparative Study of the Inquisition and the Mental Health Movement (New York: Harper

Row, 1970). On Szasz's influence, see Judi Chamberlin, "The Ex-Patients' Movement: Where We've
Been and Where We're Going" (1990) 11:3 J Mind & Behaviour 323 [Chamberlin, "Ex-Patients'
Movement"]. Chamberlin writes (at 333),
Many individuals in the ex-patients' movement first encountered a critique of the mental
health system-a critique which confirmed their feelings-in the works of Thomas Szasz.
In... a career spanning more than thirty years, Szasz has always spoken powerfully about
the essential wrongness of forced psychiatric treatment, and the fallacy of defining social
and behavioral problems as illness."
50.

See e.g. RD Laing, The Divided Self An Existential Study in Sanity and Madness, revised

ed (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books,1965); RD Laing & A Esterson, Sanity, Madness and
the Family: Families of Schizophrenics, 2nd ed (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1970). See

also Sean O'Hagan, "Kingsley Hall: RD Laing's Experiment in Anti-Psychiatry," The Guardian (2
September 2012), online: <www.theguardian.com/books/2012/sep/02/rd-laing-mental-health-sanity>.
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but rather an effect of dominant conceptual and institutional structures
susceptible to social critique.
One may trace the intellectual commitments of the radical critique of
psychiatry in Canada and the U.S. along an arc from the spare Szaszian
libertarianism prominent in the 1970s and into the 1980s," through an
intensive period of collectivizing and consciousness-raising-for which
inspiration was drawn in part from identitarian sources including the
civil rights movement and the feminist critique of patriarchy-to the
contemporary period in which a variety of social theories have been put into
play, including intersectionality theory or the analysis of interlocking bases
of oppression, as well as relational theory supportive of social and economic
rights. (The latter was particularly prominent in user/survivor advocacy in
connection with the CRPD).52 Yet for all the importance of the intellectual
sources of this politics, the social movement in resistance to psychiatry
had its primary roots in a solidarity forged through shared identification as
persons subjected to violence by state-legitimized psychiatric power. That
is, it was the experience of psychiatry as violence, rather than the force of
a particular set of intellectual or theoretical commitments, that formed the
movement's historical and phenomenological foundations.53
The centrality of a shared political identity took shape as a feature
of the "ex-patient" movement anising at various North American sites in
the late 1960s and 1970s. Judi Chamberlin was, until her death in 2010,
a key organizer in the ex-patient movement (which overlapped in various
respects with, and ultimately fed into, the user/survivor movement,
antipsychiatry, and Mad Pride). Chamberlin's own journey into activism
followed upon her experience of involuntary hospitalization and treatment
51. Chamberlin, "Ex-Patients' Movement," supranote 49 at 333. Chamberlin notes, of The National
Association of Psychiatric Survivors (NAPS), that it was
founded in 1985 as the National Alliance of Mental Patients, [NAPS] promotes the same
ideals Szasz espouses. The first item in its Goals and Philosophy Statement reads:
To promote the human and civil rights of people in and out of psychiatric treatment
situations, with special attention to their absolute right to freedom of choice. To work
towards the end of involuntary psychiatric intervention, including civil commitment
and forced procedures such as electroshock, psychosurgery, forced drugging,
restraint and seclusion, holding that such intervention against one's will is not a form
of treatment, but a violation of liberty and the right to control one 's own body and
mind.
52. See Sheila Wildeman, "Protecting Rights and Building Capacities: Challenges to Global Mental
Health Policy in Light of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities" (2013) 41:1 JL

Med & Ethics 48 at 52-53, 59 [Wildeman, "Protecting Rights and Building Capacities"].
53. Amore detailed account of the multiple and sometimes "colliding" sites through which the social
movements of resistance to coercive psychiatry arose over the 20th century is provided in Robert
Menzies, Brenda A LeFrangois & Geoffrey Reaume, "Introducing Mad Studies" in LeFranqois,
Menzies & Reaume, Mad Matters, supra note 25, 1 at 1-9 [Menzies, LeFranqois & Reaume,
"Introducing Mad Studies"].
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after a miscarriage in the late 1960s." She was later diagnosed with
schizophrenia. In the early 1970s, she became a member of the Bostonbased Mental Patients Liberation Front, after which her activism took
many forms, including a role as co-chair ofWNUSP from 2001-2004. Her
1978 book, On Our Own: Patient-ControlledAlternatives to the Mental
Health System," is recognized as a foundational text of the user/survivor
and Mad Pride movements.
Chamberlin identified the American civil rights struggle and other
liberation movements of the period (such as the fight against women's
oppression and oppression based in sexual orientation) as having helped
shape the political imagination of the movement-for instance, inspiring
strategies of consciousness-raising to expose the workings of oppression
in one's daily life. More generally, these disruptive social movements
provided examples wherein a common and relatively cohesive groupbased identity appeared to precede and inform the work of setting shared
political objectives. 5 6
Chamberlin suggested that the impetus for excluding those who did
not identify as "mental patients" or "former patients" in the early days
of the movement was to preserve the radical insights of those who had
experienced psychiatric interventions as oppression and to maintain
control over the movement's direction. She wrote:
Those groups that did not exclude non-patients from membership almost
always quickly dropped their liberation aspects and became reformist. In
addition, such groups rapidly moved away from ex-patient control, with
the tiny minority of non-patient members taking on leadership roles and
setting future goals and directions."
Chamberlin's work gives particular attention to the significance of
personal narratives, crafted and shared as a form of consciousness-raising,
to the self-understanding ofthe nascent ex-patient movement. She suggests
that consciousness-raising served to link up what had been experienced as
deeply personal "mental health problems" to a common political analysis,
and with this, a shared (and necessarily delimited) political identity:
[A]s mental patients began to share their life stories, it became clear

54. JM Lawrence, "Judi Chamberlin, Writings Took on Mental Health Care," Boston Globe
(20 January 2010), online: <www.bostoncom/bostonglobe/obituaries/articles/2010/01/20/judi
chamberlin writingstook on mental-health-care/>.
55.

Judi Chamberlin, On Our Own: Patient-ControlledAlternatives to the Mental Health System

(New York: Hawthorn Books, 1978).
56. Chamberlin, "Ex-Patients' Movement," supra note 49 at 323, 325-326.
57. Ibid at 325.
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that distinct patterns of oppression existed and that our problems and
difficulties were not solely internal and personal, as we had been told
they were. The consciousness-raising process may be hampered by
the presence of those who do not share common experiences (e.g. as
women or as mental patients). As the necessity for consciousness-raising
became more evident, it provided still another reason for limiting group
membership."
Canadian writers and activists have produced exemplary instances
of the genre of narrative-based radicalization in opposition to psychiatric
oppression;5 9 Don Weitz and Bonnie Burstow's Shrink Resistant stands out
as an influential example.60 Such works link internalized abject identities to
the collective experience of oppression, on the way to group solidarity and
resistance. In this way, lived experience is positioned as the raw material
for the individual's as well as the collective's radicalized identity.
c. Expert subjects
The psy-expert stands as the counterpoint against which radicalized identity
is constructed in this field of knowledge and power. Correspondingly, the
imperative of regulating membership underthe criterion of lived experience
has gained much of its critical intensity from what Maria Liegghio
(drawing on Gayatri Spivak) terms "epistemic violence."6 1 This describes
a form of domination and subordination whereby the operation of expert
knowledge brings about one's disqualification as a "legitimate knower." In
the case of the psychiatric subject, this may mean disqualification of one's
most intimate subjective experience of self and world-one's sense of
identity6 2 or privileged interiority-along with translation of one's "mad
speech" from the status of reason to that of symptom. The political project
of the user/survivor movement (indeed, the project of all radicalized
psy-subjects) is oriented in great part toward the rescue of subjugated or
de-legitimated self-knowledge and exposure of the phenomenon of delegitimation as violence or fundamental violation.

58. Ibid at 326.
59. See Morrison, supra note 41 at 129. Morrison identifies a phased "heroic survivor narrative"
progressing from encounter with the psychiatric system, to resistance, to politicization and advocacy
for others. She suggests that these narratives "are re-enacted and emphasized in group settings" in a
manner that "build[s] collective identity and shared experience."
60.

Bonnie Burstow & Don Weitz, eds, Shrink Resistant: The Struggle againstPsychiatryin Canada

(Vancouver: New Star Books, 1988); see also Irit Shimrat, Call Me Crazy: Stories from the Mad
Movement (Vancouver: Press Gang, 1997).
61. Maria Liegghio, "A Denial of Being: Psychiatrization as Epistemic Violence" in LeFrangois,
Menzies & Reaume, Mad Matters, supra note 25, 122 at 123, citing Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,
"Scattered Speculation on the Subaltern and the Popular" (2005) 8:4 Postcolonial Studies 475.
62. Liegghio, supra note 61 at 123.
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And yet, in one ofmany instances of reversal in this field, contemporary
developments at the radicalized core of psychiatric subjectification have
taken a marked turn toward self-conscious integration of activist and
academic identities. An exemplary instance is provided in psychiatric
survivor Erick Fabris's master's thesis, submitted to the University of
Toronto's Ontario Institute for Studies in Education in 2006 (Fabris later
published a monograph arising out of the thesis, in 2011). The thesis
takes aim at "Chemical Incarceration in Psychiatric Survivor Experiences
of Community Treatment Orders" 63 through a methodology described
as "qualitative analysis of forced treatment by someone who has been
forcibly treated." 64
Fabris writes evocatively of his astonishment and terror upon being
subjected to forced treatment just over ten years before, in Vancouver:
1993. I have experienced new experiences. I have changed myself to
perceive new realities (again). I have danced for spirit, ready for escape.
. . Retrieved to the bakery where I work, my supervisor tells me to
stand outside, lest the customers see. He reports me. My 'dance' is his
evidence....
I fret in my hospital gown as I wait for my psychiatric assessment. I will
finally know whether I am insane afteryears of evasion. My psychological
weaknesses will be splayed out before me, positively assessed using the
best instruments of modem technical science. This is what I've been
afraid of since my mother's hospitalizations for 'schizophrenia' in the
1970s. Like her, I was brought here because I began to change, to sense
life differently....
After what seems like 15 minutes, I come out of my waiting room to see
if anyone will see me. I call meekly, "is anyone there?" Shadows shift
behind plants and counters in the emergency ward. A second later I am
surrounded by waving arms and bodies pressing on me without touching,
perhaps six males of different sizes, some aggressively hunched, yelling!
My hands instinctively open in a motion of surrender. They holler, "Get
back in the room!" repeatedly, their inflection rising as if provoking....
They usher me into a flat, prone position and roughly bind my arms to
the metal railings, right ann above my head, left to my side. My mother
never told me about this treatment.

63. Erick Fabris, Identity, Inmates, Insight, Capacity, Consent, Coercion: Chemical Incarceration
in PsychiatricSurvivor Experiences of Community Treatment Orders (MA Thesis, Ontario Institute

for Studies in Education, University of Toronto, 2006), online: <psychrights.org/Countries/Canada/
DFabrisCTOchemoprison.pdf> [Fabris, Identity, Inmates, Insight]. The monograph based on the
thesis is Erick Fabris, TranquilPrisons: Chemical Incarcerationunder Community Treatment Orders

(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011).
64.

Fabris, Identity, Inmates, Insight, supra note 63 at ii.
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A few seconds later a nurse approaches my tense form with a needle.
She stabs it into my left thigh deeply and injects a fiercely burning pain.
I wince, then lay quiet, unmoving. She swabs the pricked wound with
alcohol. I am barely breathing from fear. I lie as still as I can, anything
to prevent further violence. The caregivers leave. I begin to shiver with
cold. I'm becoming drowsy. A moment or two passes. My lover enters
the room, a look of shock on her face....
Fourteen hours later? I'm awoken, parched and afraid. The snoring of
three other men in a dark room makes me start. Trolleys rattle and echo
in the recesses above the ceiling. I have no clue where I am. Is this a
mistake, a fluke? 65
The point of this narrative is to expose the violence, and sense of
fundamental violation, marking the sites of involuntary treatment. Here
and elsewhere, Fabris draws on the standpoint of madness 6 6 to critique
forced treatment not only in his own case but as generally promoted and
legitimated through Ontario's legal regime of Community Treatment
Orders (CTOs). His aim (other than, of course, to earn a graduate degree)
is to denounce this expression of mental health law and policy as effecting
"chemical imprisonment in the body." 67
The phenomenon of epistemic violence, i.e., the operation of expert
knowledge to mark one's deep or intimate sense of self or self-discovery
as illegitimate, is foregrounded in Fabris's account. And yet, on assuming
an expert stance himself, he situates his experience within a wider set
of considerations-taking the scholar's posture of not simply speaking
his own truth but engaging in examination of the truth claims of others.
The thesis is as such a project of critical inquiry into the experience of
psychiatric subjectification.
I am struck by the deep differences between Fabris's project of
engaged inquiry into his own and others' political positioning in the
field of mental health law and policy and my detached academic stance,
constructed over years. The importance of such detachment, or of striving
for it, was one of the fundamental lessons I took from my aborted doctoral
research project described in Part I. This lesson was instilled in me by
an institutional (in particular, a Research Ethics Board) culture with little
patience for academic projects blurring the roles of expert and (tentative,
aspirational, Mad-curious) ally, and even less patience for disturbing the
unitary identity of the "vulnerable research subject." In Part I, I described
65.
66.
67.

Ibid at 9-10.
Ibid at 11, 16-18.
Ibidatl,7-8.
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how my efforts to access the perspectives of persons deemed incapable
of making treatment decisions (their perspectives on the medico-legal
processes to which they had been subjected) were blocked at every turn.
One might say that the institutional culture in which I was embedded was
actively engaged in reproducing the gap between reason and madness,
the constitutive exclusion whereby reason constructs monologues about
madness on the basis of the other's silence. In the end, my proposed
research project succeeded only as "evidence of a broken dialogue." 6 8
Compare this with Fabris's hard-won insights. He commences with
a research question centring on identity: "From both an epistemological
and pharmacological view, I ask how drugging can affect perception,
understanding, memory, motivation, feeling, which inform identity." 69
Fabris then brings his own and others' experiences of forced intervention
to bear upon the competing perspectives of "clinicians and others" who
"perceive the results of drugging as improvement"-a position that "lends
to the moral defense of force."7 Ultimately, the effect is to disrupt the
legitimation of CTOs as equality- or liberty-respecting, illuminating
instead the experiential bases on which resistant psy-subjects denounce
CTOs as subjection to alien invasion, foreign forces bent upon muting or
attacking one's most intimate sense of self
Fabris additionally uses narrative to explore themes associated with
Mad Pride, bringing out alternative conceptual or cultural frameworks
for interpreting behaviours or states of mind coded as disordered. Thus
he writes of the "capacity" for madness, of madness as "a process of
achievement," now reaching back before his encounter with coercive
psychiatry to relay his prior interpretation of his shifting mental states as a
creative or spiritual journey. This was a journey, Fabris relates, that "began
with a creative and spiritual drive to merge my everyday life with my
symbolic life." 1 He continues:
[W]hen 'madness' emerged all articles of faith and principles of beauty
receded in stature. The search brought me to see, to perceive, in ways
that depended less and less on the norms I had grown up with, the usual
turns of phrase, the usual expressions of feeling. I found myself behind
the curtain of language and logic, able to modify these programs tacitly. 2
68.

This is Richard Howard's translation of a passage (quoted above) from Foucault's Preface to the

1961 Edition of History ofMadness. See Foucault, History ofMadness, supra note 6, and compare
Howard's translation, Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization:A History oflnsanity in the Age of

Reason, translated by Richard Howard (New York: Vintage Books, 1973) at x-xi.
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70.
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72.
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Fabris contrasts this "natural" or intimately self-apprehended state
to what he positions as the artifice of psychiatric diagnosis and forced
pharmacological interventions:
This was a transformative yet natural 'capacity', before I was incarcerated
and drugged in Vancouver in 1993. Psychiatrists called this private
achievement a 'psychosis (not otherwise specified)', then, because I later
admitted to feeling sad in the institution, as 'bipolar affective disorder.' 7 3
Thus Fabris expresses, in highly personal terms, central tenets of Mad
Pride: that madness is an expression of human diversity which, while in
some circumstances linked with "horror," may (particularly if greeted with
openness) also bring "joy," enriching one's exposure to and facility with a
range of ways of experiencing self and world. Having produced this richly
textured account, he asks: "Can 'mad' people not author a new narrative
of 'madness', or does the word by definition prevent us from speaking of
self and reality?""
By writing as a self-identified Mad scholar, Fabris has defiantly
answered this question. And yet it remains that to speak in the register
of madness is to render oneself and one's truth claims susceptible to
heightened suspicion. Does speaking in the register of madness necessarily
re-enact the divide between reason and madness, and with this, reinforce
norms of exclusion? I return to this question near the end of my inquiry, on
considering the broader institutional context or culture of resistance that
is Mad Studies.
d. Politics and/oflaw
Just as Fabris deals head-on with the role of identity (as scholar and as Mad
activist) in constituting his scholarship, other radicalized psy-subjects (in
particular, users/survivors) have reflected on the function of identity in
social justice claims-making.
The paradox and potential of constructing social justice claims
expressive of resistance to psychiatric subjectification through an appeal
to a collective political identity came to the fore in the negotiation and
drafting of the CRPD." Tina Minkowitz, co-chair of WNUSP at the time,
has addressed the critique that framing the movement's claims in the
73. Ibid at 10-11.
74. Ibid at 11.
75. On the role of WNUSP and other Disabled Persons Organizations in the UN process of arriving
at a Convention, see Salie, supra note 42. Tina Minkowitz offers a first-hand account: Tina Minkowitz,
"CRPD Advocacy by the World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry: The Emergence
of a User/Survivor Perspective in Human Rights" (14 August 2012), online: SSRN <ssrn.com/
abstract=2326668>.

Agonizing Identity in Mental Health Law and Policy (Part II):
A Political Taxonomy of Psychiatric Subjectification

169

language of disability-based discrimination may conflict with the strong
social constructionist model that many in the movement adopt (i.e., the
view that mental illness/psychosocial disability is socially constructed "all
the way down").7 6
Minkowitz acknowledges the risks of grounding user/survivor claims
in disability identity, even on the interactive account of disability advanced
under the social or bio-psycho-social model. She writes: "Paradoxically in
naming the discrimination and calling attention to the needs there is a risk
of a discriminatory, violent, and objectifying response, an essentializing
of our identity that diminishes our full humanity."" However, she adds,
"This is the challenge faced by every equality-seeking movement and it
is not the end of the story but, rather, is an ongoing call for humanity to
grapple with injustice."" Minkowitz further references the principle from
antidiscrimination law (including the law in Canada) that discrimination
may be based in purely subjective perceptions of functional impairment
or other wholly-imputed group characteristics.7 9 This, she suggests, makes
space for the claims of those who accept as well as those who deny that
there is truth-content to the categories of impairment under which they
are described. Thus "disability" may support diverse social justice claims,
including claims based in
the hegemony of 'nonality' as a value judgment against the full range of
human diversity, needs that are not being met in environments designed
without appreciation of such diversity, and either subjective experience
of limitation or impairment in one's own mind, body, or behavior, or
being regarded by others as having such a limitation or impairment."
This response does not resolve the concerns about unintentional
reification of oppressive conceptual structures. But it does speak to the
prospect of making space for difference within a politically and legally
salient identity category. Near the close ofthis essay, I return to the prospect
of reconciling identity-based solidarity with agonistic pluralist deliberation
on the scope and limits of both "disability" and "social justice."

76. Tina Minkowitz, "Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Liberation from
Psychiatric Oppression" in Burstow, LeFrangois & Diamond, supra note 37, 129 [Minkowitz,
"Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities"].
77. Ibidat 131.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid at 129. See Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse)
v Montreal (City); Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v

Boisbriand(City), 2000 SCC 27, [2000] 1 SCR 665.
80. Minkowitz, "Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities," supra note 76 at 130-131.
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Conclusion: Negotiating identity in the radical politics of mental
health
This section has outlined how the social movement of resistance to
coercive psychiatry and psychiatric subjectification was forged through
consciousness-raising and soon took on an identitarian cast, as participants
sought to create a space free of psy-expert domination and to maintain
a close connection between the lived experience of oppression and the
movement's goals. Then and since, the movement has encompassed
distinct and overlapping constituencies and objectives. Yet, on all sides,
there is an acknowledged risk that grounding resistance in claims to a
shared identity, lived experience, or both, may reproduce psychiatric and
neo-liberal hegemony through the deep logic of reason and madness,
so perpetuating forms of social exclusion and violence informed and
sustained by psychiatric knowledge.
What possibility is there for a radical mental health politics if even the
most radicalized forms of claims-making may reinforce the fixed binaries
that structure the status quo? Here one might return to and consider more
carefully the ironizing strategies of the Mad movement, and ask: What
are the comparable moves, in the politics of madness, to queer theory's
queering-querying, playing with and so disrupting sex/gender norms and
other fixed identities?" What localized strategies might disrupt mental
health identities and so assist in unsettling the contemporary mental health
imaginary?
One Mad strategy (by no means the only one),8 2 evinced in the work
of Fabris and others, involves troubling the divide between the (rational)
expert and the (mad) research subject. This I pursue further in the final
e.

81. See Eve Kosovsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1990); Eve Kosovsky Sedgwick, Tendencies (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993). On
contemporary directions in queer theory as it intersects with law, see Robert Leckey & Kim Brooks,
eds, Queer Theory: Law, Culture, Empire (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010).
82. I used the following example elsewhere (Wildeman, "Protecting Rights and Building Capacities,"
supra note 52 at 54), but it is worth recalling here. In 2006, during the negotiations of the CRPD, John
McCarthy, founder of Mad Pride Ireland, was invited to sit among the national delegates and make
a statement from the floor. In what follows, he describes a moment of political theatre in which he
paid tribute to a friend struggling against social isolation and repeated involuntary hospitalizations in
Ireland:
I am very proud to say I did make a statement from the floor and that I then shuffled around
that enormous chamber to show those delegates the reality of over medication. Have you
any idea how embarrassing it is to shuffle like I did, and see the faces of those delegates as
I passed in front of each countries desk all 196 of them, some with looks of sympathy and
understanding others with looks of anger at this breach of protocol. But I kept [Helena's] face
to the forefront of my mind as the tears welled up at the back of my eyes and I finished the
circuit as the business of the convention carried on. The point was made.
John McCarthy, "Report by John McCarthy-MindFreedom delegate in the United Nations," online:
<www.mindfreedom.org/kb/mental-health-global/j ohn-mccarthy-un>.
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section of this essay, in connection with what I term spectral identity: a
speculative category linked to the prospect of agonizing mental health
identity in the company of other minds. First, however, I turn to the most
populous category in my taxonomy: the consumers.
2. The consumer classes
The second entry in my taxonomy is expressly constructed through the
discourse of the market: the mental health or psychiatric "consumer." I
break this class into two sub-types: (1) consumer advocates (who pursue
individualized diagnoses and services, while also serving as public
stakeholders in mental health systems delivery or oversight and/or
campaigns to combat the stigma understood to inhibit help-seeking); and
(2) closeted consumers (who remain politically invisible qua consumers,
while advocating for individualized services and accommodations on a
confidential basis). Consumers are distinct from the radicalized subjects
discussed in the last section in that they do not seek to fundamentally
disrupt the conceptual and institutional bases of psychiatry or of mental
health law and policy.8 3
I am not sure where in my taxonomy to position certain expressions
of mental health identity that, like Mad Pride, affirm the value of derided
psychiatric categories, but do not or do not typically link this to a wider
political project. I am thinking, for instance, of the pro-ana (anorexia) or
pro-mia (bulimia) movements," or the amputee wannabes classed under
the heading apotemnophilia or, more recently, body integrity identity
disorder." Like adherents of Mad Pride, these subject communities
actively self-identify under pathologized categories or behaviours that
others regard as self-destroying. They forge strong counter-cultural bonds
through (often online) communications exploring shared (abnormal)
norms and values and promoting awareness of unique "ways of being
mad." Yet, once again, these subjects do not tend to actively position
themselves as part of a wider movement in resistance to psychiatric or
other forms of social oppression. In some ways, it is fitting to class such
83. I do not contemplate "radical consumers" in my schematic. This is a contestable point among
self-identified consumers and survivors. See Diamond, "Building Solidarity," supra note 25 at 67-68.
And see Bradley Lewis, "A Mad Fight: Psychiatry and Disability Activism" in Lennard J Davis, ed,
The DisabilityStudies Reader, 3rd ed (New York: Routledge, 2010) 160.
84. See e.g. MPA, online: <www.myproana.com>. And see Sarah Rainey, "Secretly Starving: Inside
the World of Anorexia Blogging," The Telegraph (24 February 2014), online: <s.telegraph.co.uk/
graphics/projects/inside-the-world-of-anorexia-blogging/>.
85. See Carl Elliott, "A New Way to be Mad," The Atlantic (December 2000), online: <www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2000/12/a-new-way-to-be-mad/304671/>;
Christopher
James
Ryan, "Out on a Limb: The Ethical Management of Bodily Integrity Identity Disorder" (2009) 2:1
Neuroethics 21.
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communities as radical psy-subjects given their defiant valorization of
deviant norms; yet they may also be classed as sub-types of consumer,
given the function of the norms in question less as a throughway to social
or political critique than to a life of uncompromising work on the self, in
the neo-liberal tradition of work on the self as one's life's work. In my
political taxonomy, these are perhaps best classed as treatment resistant
variants of psychiatric consumer.
a. Consumer advocates
Use of the term "consumer" to denote persons accessing psychiatric
services appears to have emerged in the early 1980s, as service providers
and governments sought to respond to public agitation and protest by way
of enhanced stakeholder involvement.86 At the same time, the descriptor
signaled self-directing or agentic capacities: "consumer" active, "patient"
passive.

The emergence of the consumer on the scene of psychiatric
subjectification tracks observations of Nikolas Rose on the rise of
"responsibilization" and "autonomization" as an effect of neoliberalism
registering across the arenas of health care. Rose writes:
[P]atients are increasingly urged to become active and responsible
consumers of medical services and products ranging from
pharmaceuticals to reproductive technologies and genetic tests. This
complex of marketization, autonomization, and responsibilization gives
a particular character to the contemporary politics of life in advanced
liberal democracies."

Chan Chee Khoon brings the work of Rose into relationship with health
policy developments in the U.K. in the mid-2000s, suggesting that the
policy focus on supplying health care consumers with the knowledge
required to make good choices pushes to the background structural and
systemic forces constraining choice, while laying the groundwork for

86. See Chamberlin, "Ex-Patients' Movement," supra note 49 at 333-334; Lewis, supra note 83 at
121.
87. See Lewis, supra note 83 at 121.
88.

Nikolas Rose, The Politics of Life Itself Biomedicine, Power and Subjectivity in the Twenty-

FirstCentury (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007) at 4 [references omitted].
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punitive responses to those regarded as choosing badly.8 9 Parallel themes
are pursued by Kimberley White and Ryan Pike in connection with
mental health literacy programs in Canada, which they argue function to
naturalize mental health/illness while suppressing "opposing ideologies
and culturally diverse ways of understanding, living with and responding
to madness." 9 0
The term "consumer" attracts a range of responses from radicalized
psy-subjects, from derision to begrudging acceptance, owing to its
forthright appeal to contractual rights and bargaining power in a field
routinely maligned not only by radicals but also by mainstream critics
for its lack of accessible, meaningful options. 1 Radical activists have
further reason to resent the term for its positioning of service users as
free and informed choosers while dissident non-consumers continue to be
positioned as irresponsibly non-compliant.9 2
Judi Chamberlin sums up the critical understanding of psychiatric
consumerism at the radical core of resistance to psychiatric subjectification.
She notes that the U.S. -based National Association of Psychiatric Survivors
89. Chan Chee Khoon, "Choosing Health, Constrained Choices" (2009) 16:4 Global Health
Promotion 54. In a similar vein, see Abram Anders, "Foucault and the 'the Right to Life': From
Technologies of Normalization to Societies of Control" (2013) 33:3 Disability Studies Q, online:
<dsq-sds.org/article/view/3340>. Anders writes:
Though they may appear on the surface to empower individuals, contemporary procedures
of knowledge production and mechanisms of control only solidify relations of power at a
deeper level by involving individuals as "consumers." In societies of control, we are not
only incited to discover the "truth" of our identity and to be subjugated thereby; we are also
induced to pursue a program of rehabilitation that would secure a new foundation for our
always, already displaced abject identities. In other words, the productive moment in the
society of control is not solely the constitution of the individual as object for disciplinary
examination, but the injunction for individuals to experiment and objectify themselves in
the pursuit of ever evolving forms of normativity and health
90. Kimberley White & Ryan Pike, "The Making and Marketing of Mental Health Literacy in
Canada" in LeFranqois, Menzies & Reaume, Mad Matters, supra note 25, 239 at 239. Elsewhere,
White addresses the hegemonic tendencies of anti-stigma campaigns in positioning mental illness as
disease entity, so entrenching a divide as between those who accept the disease model and those who
refuse it and as such are positioned as irresponsible, "shadowy" "mad" characters: Kimberley White,
"Out of the Shadows and into the Spotlight: The Politics of (Jn)visibility and the Implementation
of the Mental Health Commission of Canada" in Kimberley White, ed, Configuring Madness:
Representation, Context and Meaning (Oxford, UK: Inter-Disciplinary Press, 2009) 225 [White, "Out
of the Shadows"].
91. See Diamond, "Building Solidarity," supra note 25 at 67-68, where Diamond observes that
"Following the introduction of government-funded consumer initiatives and consumer
positions within mental health organizations [30 years ago], the term has become
widespread and is now used by many associated with psychiatric survivor initiatives. Some
survivors express the view 'that the term fails to communicate the reality of psychiatric
violence or coercion,' while some who identify as consumers 'resent the stance of some
psychiatric survivors, which is perceived to be harsh and critical of those who identify
as consumers in the community and who do not relate to the more radical terminology."'
92. Ibid at 68.
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("founded in 1985 as the National Alliance of Mental Patients") "was
formed specifically to counter the trend toward reformist 'consumerism,'
which developed as the psychiatry establishment began to fund ex-patient
self-help." 93 She adds:
Ironically, the same developments which led to the movement's growth
and to the operation of increasing numbers of ex-patient-run alternative
programs, also weakened the radical voices within the movement and
promoted the views of far more cooperative "consumers." The very term
"consumer" implies an equality of power which simply does not exist;
mental health "consumers" are still subject to involuntary commitment
and treatment and the defining of their experience by others.94
Shaindl Diamond's critical ethnographic work in Toronto brings to light
further nuances in this story. Diamond notes that some self-identified
survivors recognize consumer-based initiatives, such as involvement in
systems oversight and reform, as "an opportunity for survivors to influence
change from within the system, while getting paid for their labour, by
participating in forums where real policy, program, and funding decisions
are made." 95 Still, such views tend to be conflicted, acknowledging that
consumer activism "has in some ways diluted the collective vision and
energies of psychiatric survivors-a strategic action taken by governments
to make them appear accountable to psychiatric survivors without really
addressing underlying problems." 96
In Part I, I noted that consumer representation is inscribed in
my home province's Involuntary Psychiatric Treatment Act, 97 which
preferences persons who "are or have been a consumer of mental health
services" for appointment as lay members of the tribunal overseeing the
Act's application. This marks a bid for legitimacy through something
like representation of the class of persons directly affected. Yet it raises
the question: what is the significance of identification as "consumer"
to the formation, interpretation, or application of laws authorizing and
delimiting involuntary psychiatric interventions? In what sense is this
form of identification politically, morally or legally salient within this
field, otherwise populated by medico-legal "experts"?
It may be that many who identify as mental health consumers have
very little in common with those who are or who have been subjected
93.
94.
95.
96.

Chamberlin, "The Ex-Patients' Movement," supra note 49 at 333.
Ibid at 333-334.
Diamond, "Building Solidarity," supra note 25 at 68.
Ibid.

97.

Involuntary PsychiatricTreatmentAct, SNS 2005, c 42, s 65(2)(c). See "Part I," supra note 1 at

632-633.
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to involuntary psychiatric interventions. Indeed, as suggested above in
relation to social movement politics, those who self-represent as survivors
have a complex and at times antagonistic relationship with what are
regarded as more mainstream consumer perspectives. For their part,
psychiatry-allied consumers may dismiss (as appeals to a false and hollow
form of liberty, "rotting with one's rights on") survivors' accounts of selfdiscovery through resistance and medication non-compliance.
So how should we read law's gesture to mental health identity in
this and other legal and policy mechanisms? One response would be
to download the weight of legitimacy crisis onto those designated as
consumer reps by requiring that they reflect publicly on their ideological
or normative commitments and situate these in light of the positions
of others, including radicalized psy-subjects. But the prior question is
whether or how carving out such spaces for representation enhances the
legitimacy of the legal processes in issue. Arguably, the point and effect of
"inclusion" is less to grapple with the full complexity of this field of power
relations than to construct the appearance, or illusion, of legitimacy. The
question then becomes: who or what is pressed further into the shadows
when the consumers come "out of the shadows and into the spotlight"?9 8
I suggest that it is the non-compliant or treatment resistant psychiatric
subject, the subject most at risk of translation to object, who is relegated
to the shadows of mental health policy and politics when the consumer
steps up.
b.

Closeted consumers and closing the gap between consumers and
survivors
Psychiatric consumers may be further subdivided to distinguish those
just described, the politically visible consumers who enter into political
or legal decision making fora, from those who actively self-advocate but
are not as such visibly political. This includes both those who succeed
in accessing services or accommodations and those who are disbelieved
and denied. Both these forms of invisible consumer (the successful and
unsuccessful) comprise what Susan Stefan terms "the discreditable."
In a 2003 article,9 9 Stefan draws upon responses to a survey she
conducted about experiences of discrimination based in psychiatric
98.

Senate, Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, Out of the

Shadows atLast: TransformingMentalHealth, Mental Illness andAddition Services in Canada(May

2006) (Chair: The Honourable Michael JL Kirby). I am drawing more specifically on Kimberley
White's redeployment of the "out of the shadows" trope: White, "Out of the Shadows," supra note 90.
99. Susan Stefan, "'Discredited' and 'Discreditable': The Search for Political Identity by People
with Psychiatric Diagnoses" (2003) 44:3 Wm & Mary L Rev 1341. Stefan's essay does not engage
directly with the consumer who fashions a public, political identity out of his/her mental health status.
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disability. The survey was directed at "people who perceived themselves
as psychiatrically disabled, who had a diagnosis of serious mental illness,
or who thought others perceived them as psychiatrically disabled." 0 0
Stefan identified patterns in the responses reflecting Erving Goffnan's
distinction between the discredited ("people whose stigmatizing features
are public knowledge") and the discreditable ("people who can conceal
their stigmatizing characteristic").10 1 She classed as "discredited" those
who had been subject to overt, egregious stereotyping and exclusion
or had experienced violence (physical and epistemic) in the name of
psychiatric treatment. She classed as "discreditable" the roughly equal
number of survey respondents who may have accessed mental health
services, including hospital treatment for "serious mental illness," but
whose diagnosed conditions were not public knowledge because of
circumstances making it possible for them to choose whether or not to
disclose (i.e., those able to "pass").102 The discrimination experienced by
those classed as "discreditable" tended to take the form of disbelief or
discrediting of their claims to mental health problems, resulting in denial
of accommodations or supports.103
What precisely the circumstances are that allow some the ability to
pass is not something Stefan could determinatively assert. However, she
writes:
[T]he distinctions between discredited and discreditable individuals
do not arise from differences in severity of diagnosis, symptomology,
or bizarreness of behaviour. Like the discredited, discreditable people
have hallucinations and delusions, attempt suicide, cut themselves, have
multiple personalities, and experience mania and hospitalization.'

100. Ibid at 1357.
101. Ibid at 1350, citing Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management ofSpoiled Identity

(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1963) at 4.
102. Stefan, supra note 99 at 1344, writes: "Issues surrounding self-revelation and 'coming out' are
crucial to many people with invisible disabilities. These people may go to enormous lengths to conceal
their disabilities from their colleagues at work and even their families."
103. Stefan, ibid at 1360, reports that while "accounts of 'traditional' discrimination and forcible
commitment and treatment amounted to just more than half of the responses," the rest were from
people who "identified their experiences with discrimination in what seemed to be precisely the
opposite way." She adds:
Virtually all of these "different" responses were submitted in response to the Internet
posting, and many came from people currently employed as lawyers, social workers,
academics, and in other professional fields. These respondents experienced discrimination
as the failure of others to take seriously their reports of suffering and difficulty. Their
experience of discrimination was of being treated as an ordinary, normal person who was
oversensitive or subject to hypochondria. There were told to cheer up, to stop being lazy,
or to stop goldbricking.
104. Ibid at 1354.
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Drawing on her experience as a human rights academic and lawyer,
Stefan speculates on what factors may influence whether or not one is able
to move relatively seamlessly from intensive psychosocial disturbances
and related interaction with the mental health system back to one's daily
life without attracting public identification. The factors she suggests
include socioeconomic status (and with this, in the U.S. context, ability
to access private hospitals and so avoid "substandard state institutional
conditions" o'-although Stefan indicates that wealth is not a necessary
or sufficient condition for avoiding discredited status); also race, gender,
and culture; familial or parental supports; and mainstream employment. 1 0 6
However, she observes that "[b]y far the greatest determinant" of whether
individuals come to enter the ranks of those who are discredited on the
basis of psychiatric disability status-those who are othered or identified
as oppositional to the norm (and who may defiantly self-identify as such)is the experience of forced treatment. Echoing the accounts surveyed
earlier of physical and epistemic violence issuing in radicalization, Stefan
speculates that the experience of involuntary psychiatric interventions may
stimulate a critical analysis of psychiatry, or in particular of involuntary or
otherwise coercive interventions, as abuse and oppression, so producing a
resistant identity. 10 7
Stefan's reflections are valuable in bringing the identity of the
psychiatric dissenter or survivor into contact with other ways in which
identity may be conditioned by psychiatric knowledge. Specifically, she
suggests that a diagnosis of psychiatric illness may provoke a range of
responses in terms of integration or non-integration into one's identity and
one's politics. Referencing William Styron's Darkness Visible,os Stefan
observes that some "who concede that their lives have been profoundly
affected by psychiatric disability appear to deny that it plays any part in
their continuing personal identity."1 0 9 Still others "believe that psychiatric
disability is central to [their] identity, but consider it an illness with no
political meaning."110

105. Ibid at 1351.
106. Ibid at 1354-1356.
107. Ibid at 1355-1356.
108. William Styron, Darkness isible: A Memoir ofMadness (New York: Random House, 1990).
109. Stefan, supra note 99 at 1347. Stefan cites a statement from near the end of Styron's book: "Save
for the awfulness of certain memories it leaves, acute depression inflicts few permanent wounds."
(Styron, supra note 108 at 75, quoted in Stefan, supra note 99 at 1347). Stefan adds, "It did, however,
have enough impact on him to lead him to write a book." (Stefan, supra note 99 at 1347, n 18)
110. Stefan, supra note 99 at 1347.
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Against this background, Stefan writes compellingly of the fragility
of mental health-based group identification as a basis for social justice
claims:

"

The detennination by experts that a person has a "mental illness,"
sometimes after fifteen minutes of evaluation in a hospital emergency
room, unites into one category millions of people with extraordinarily
divergent personal experiences who might otherwise never think to
identify with each other.
Developing this theme, Stefan observes that
[e]xperiences of stigma and discrimination, identity, and political
agendas presently vary greatly between people in the "discredited" and
"discreditable" categories. Ultimately, social structures play each group
off the other, rendering both categories politically weaker than they
would be if they were to unite and proceed as one bloc of millions of
people." 2
In sum, Stefan suggests that integration of the political concerns of
the discreditable with those of the discredited is stymied by contestation
around "the question of who does or does not have apsychiatric disability";
by the possibility that even persons so identified may not see "any political
connection between [their] disability and its social consequences";113 and
by the reality that "the ex-patient movement's concern with minimizing or
halting forced psychiatric treatment is essentially irrelevant to the millions
of people who are discreditable."n' Nonetheless, she holds out some
hope for an expanded and strengthened identity-based social movement
bringing together the discredited and discreditable, or what I have termed
radicalized psy-subjects and mental health consumers. Specifically, Stefan
argues that shared political identity might be constructed upon the common
experience of epistemic violence-that is, expert discrediting of the
individual's intimate appraisal of his/her own mental states, whether that
appraisal consists in denial or assertion of illness. Such common ground,
she speculates, might inform an unprecedented resistance movement
bringing together the radicalized critique of psychiatric coercion with
more moderate calls for meaningful, accessible, voluntary services and
supports.15

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Ibid at
Ibid at
Ibid at
Ibid at
Ibid at

1345.
1350.
1348-1349.
1351 [footnote omitted].
1378-1380.
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But even if we put aside the practical questions about how the
requisite solidarity might be generated among those who reject all or
much of psychiatry as coercive and those who look to psychiatry for
life-saving supports, we might ask: is expansion of a singular identitybased movement a promising response to the parallel world politics of the
radicalized and consumer classes? Might such a mega-movement be more
likely to suck the radical politics out of the radicals than to radicalize the
consumers? This concern is heightened on considering the rapid expansion
of psychiatric categories for defining self-understanding in ways that are
perfectly pitched to the neo-liberal ethic of work on the self.116
Might there be another way, beyond expansion of a singular
group-based identity under the sign of psychiatric (or for that matter,
psychosocial) disability, to integrate the justice claims of the consumer
class with those of the radicalized? What if the common project were
instead to disengagethe work of social justice from the constructs of mental
health-to disrupt the coherence of the category, as such to shift from
the logic of identity/difference to a common ethic of building resilience
and promoting the flourishing of all?1 17 Might such efforts provoke more
intensive engagement with socioeconomic inequality-not because
such inequality functions as a "determinant of mental illness""' (with
this term's inbuilt redirection toward individual deviance and treatment)
but because it is inherently unjust? Might such a politics more squarely
address the injustice of poverty and un- and underemployment (domestic
and global); accelerating environmental degradation; increased reliance on
and subjection to technology; and the interaction of these and other social
problems with race, gender, gender identity, and other forms of oppression
both familiar and emerging-the critique of which has arguably been
blunted or colonized by our growing preoccupation with "mental health"?
The worry animating this section on mental health consumerism is
that our ability to engage in social justice critique in and beyond mental
health law and policy has been subverted by the operation of a master code
("mental health") insinuated deep in our identity and our politics. Might
a post-identity (or post-mental health) politics, oriented to displacing the

116. See "Part I," supra note 1 at 637-639.
117. See Martha Albertson Fineman, "The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human
Condition," (2008) 20:1 Yale JL & Feminism 1 [Fineman, "Vulnerable Subject"]; Martha Albertson
Fineman, "Beyond Identities: The Limits of an Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality" (2012) 92:6
BUL Rev 1713.
118. On the tendency for the discourse of population mental healthto redirect from social determinants
to the priorities of biopsychiatry and psychopharmacology, see Wildeman, "Protecting Rights and
Building Capacities," supra note 52 at 49-52.
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preoccupation with mental health or mental health status in favour of
renewed attention to political economy, and to the flow of power through
identity, be better equipped to rethink the foundations of social justice?
And what would it take to activate such a politics? Here once again we
contemplate the funhouse of "queering" (or "madding")1 1 9 at the frontiers
of psychiatric subjectification.
3. Liminal subjects: The suggestible and the spectral
The last category in my political taxonomy is the liminal subject, standing
at the threshold of psychiatric subjectification. I identify two sub-types:
the suggestible and the spectral.
The suggestible are those poised to join the ranks of the mental
health consumers: the not yet active or activated consumers-psychiatric
subjectification's ripest fruit. They are not (or not yet) involved in seeking
out psychiatric diagnoses or treatments; however, as in the case of my
casual encounter with Adult ADHD (described in Part I), they are in many
senses prepared for the moment when a diagnosis falls into their laps. This
is a constituency (if it can be called that) that promises to swell and spill
over rapidly into the ranks of more robust mental health identities in the
face of developments like the expanded diagnostic categories and criteria

of DSM-5.120
The more challenging category in the liminal zone, the spectral,
speaks to latent transformational possibilities at the limits of psychiatric
subjectification. This is a status or subject position that places "mental
health" into question, as such pausing at the threshold of constitutive
exclusion as if to recreate, through an act of imagination, the moment before
the dichotomy of reason and madness sorted human diversity through the
logic of domination and subordination. "The spectral identity floats beyond
the poles, not leaving them behind but reflecting on their provisionality. "121
"Spectral" here signifies an emptying out or dematerialization of identity:
phantasmic, ghostly, a state of suspension as between identity and nonidentity, normal and abnormal. This is not to portend the wholesale
collapse of difference into indifference, but the possibility of episodic
entry into reflection on the provisionality of mental health identity, and a
politics of shared ends not rooted in identity (or "mental health"). Rooted
in what, then? Our creative capacity for self-(re)fashioning? Our common

119. On queering, see the references at note 81, supra. For an original take on the common cracked
foundations of queer studies and mad studies, see Lynne Huffer, Madfor Foucault:Rethinking the
Foundationsof Queer Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009).
120. See "Part I," supra note 1 at 637-639.
121. Ibid at 642.
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materiality? I suggest that giving content to the (shifting) shared ends
of social justice in the liminal spaces of spectral identity requires both
activation of our capacity for unfixing identity categories (our capacity
for queering or madding identity)1 2 2 and attentiveness to the material or
socio-economic foundations of this and other human capacities.1 2 3 One
might say that to occupy the space of spectral identity is to reflect on our
materiality from the standpoint of immateriality, of possibility.
And so my political taxonomy issues in the idea that all the classes
of mental health identity surveyed contain latent possibilities for
transformational politics. All are sites at which we can and should be
plotting our next move: if not a determinative rejection of identity as a
basis for our politics, then at least a willingness to take a break, now and
then, from "mental health."
Thus we arrive again at the question: What would it mean to wean
ourselves, individually and as a society, from our addiction to mental
health? Might we come to ask different questions of the social and political
order, or to ask those questions more urgently than we are presently?
Might we become more sensitive to othering and exclusion, not just in the
domain of mental health law and policy but along the full continuum of
human capacity and vulnerability, power and oppression?
The prior question is how to activate our capacity to explore these
questions: how to enter into the liminal zone.
III. From spectral identity to agonizing identity
Earlier, I noted WNUSP representative Tina Minkowitz's defense of
"disability" as a vehicle for social justice claims-making among radicalized
psy-subjects. Minkowitz argued that the category can accommodate
diverse interpretations and applications, making space even for those who
hold a strong nominalist or social constructionist understanding of mental/
psychiatric disability. However, she acknowledged the residual concern
that reliance on this or other identity categories marked as vulnerable to
domination or subordination may function to perpetuate the conceptual
structures through which oppression is legitimized. In what follows,
I explore this concern (and some initial responses to it) further, before
turning to a couple of final suggestions for redressing the more corrosive
aspects of the politics of identity and difference-suggestions I position as

122. See the references at notes 81 and 119.
123. See Fineman, "Vulnerable Subject," supra note 117 at 12 (we are "born, live, and die within
a fragile materiality that renders all of us constantly susceptible to destructive external forces and
internal disintegration").
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bridging the liminal state of spectral identity with the collectivist ethic of
agonistic pluralism.
1. Agonizing (mental health) identity revisited: Quit cold turkey?
In taking up the possibilities for an emancipatory mental health politics
(viewed from the speculative perspective of spectral identity), we might
first consider the proposal that we quit our mental health identity habit
"cold turkey" 12 4-that is, just say no to the conceptualization of personal
and social problems or departures from dominant norms in the language
of psychiatry or mental illness/health, even mental or psychosocial
disability.125 I have noted already antipsychiatry scholar Bonnie Burstow's
concerns about the recuperative potential in the discursive strategies of
Mad Pride.126 Burstow further provides a list of rough analogies for matters
at the core of antipsychiatry advocacy, framed in turn in the discourse
of medicine, government, Mad Pride ("reclaiming"), and antipsychiatry
("refusal").127 She argues that those opposing coercive psychiatry should
adopt antipsychiatry's strategy of "refusal," so avoiding language that
might reproduce hegemony in favour of language that expressly exposes
and denounces coercion. Thus what for medicine and government are
"psychiatric hospitals" are in antipsychiatry-speak "psychoprisons" (not
Mad Pride's "looneybins"); what medicine and government call "treatment"
is "intervention/assault." (Here Burstow lists no reclaimed term for Mad
Pride-a gap suggesting its further parting ways with antipsychiatry.) And
mental illness, mental disorder, and mental disability become "a way of
being or processing that psychiatrists do not see as 'normal"' (not Mad
Pride's reclaimed "disability"), while mentally disordered and mentally
ill translate to "troubled, having emotional problems, having problems in
living, having a spiritual crisis" (not Mad Pride's "Mad, lunatic, psycho,
crazy, nutter").128
The theoretical stakes of this line of argument are elaborated by
Shelly Tremain in a critique specifically targeting identification under

124. The roots of this expression apparently reach both to candour or directness of purpose (as in
"talking turkey" whichfor shadowy reasons connotes directness of speech), and the pale, goosebumpy
appearance of one who is in withdrawal from an addictive substance. Similarly, an abrupt shut-down
of mental health talk might result both in more direct expression of the root causes of problems,
and significant physical and psychological distress. (Matt Soniak, "Why is Abruptly Quitting
Something Called 'Going Cold Turkey'?," Mental Floss (18 October 2012), online: <mentalfloss.
com/article/12798/why-abruptly-quitting-something-called-going-cold-turkey>.)
125. See the references at note 48, supra.
126. See the text accompanying notes 38-39, supra, discussing Burstow, "Rose by Any Other Name,"
supra note 38.

127. Burstow, "Rose by Any Other Name," supra note 38 at 83.
128. Ibid at 82-85.
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the descriptor "disability."1 2 9 Tremain argues that, like the sex/gender
divide critiqued by Judith Butler, the social model of disability asserts the
political and cultural contingency of "disability" (viewed as an interaction
between individual impairments and social and attitudinal environments)
in a manner that problematically relies on an individualized and
naturalized "impairment." The disability movement concedes too muchindeed it concedes the field-when it accepts a naturalized model of
impairment rather than striving to expose the cultural and political forces
that construct impairment. Tremain further draws on the Foucauldian
concept of governmentality to suggest that "subjects are produced who
'have' impairments because this identity meets certain requirements of
contemporary social and political arrangements."1 3 0 She adds: "Indeed, it
would seem that the identity of the subject of the social model ('people
with impairments') is actually formed in large measure by the political
arrangements it was designed to contest." Ultimately, Tremain warns, "a
social movement that grounds its claims to entitlement in that identity will
inadvertently extend those arrangements."131
But, once again, what is the alternative? While Burstow argues for
a discursive shift that might cure us of our addiction to mental health,
her proposed alternatives do not (as yet?) have much social or political
resonance, even within the social movement in resistance to psychiatric
coercion. That is, as indicated by the convergence of "users and survivors"
in advocacy organizations like WNUSP, many in the movement continue to
rely on the language and institutions of the mental health system to access
therapies, social supports, and accommodations.1 3 2 More generally, across
contemporary North America, mental health and disability discourse is so
deeply embedded in our self-conceptions and in our public institutions that
it would be no more possible to step entirely outside this discursive field
than to step outside our bodies.
2. Reversibility
Anna Mollow pushes back at Tremain's arguments on the need to wholly
detach from the conceptual and institutional apparatus of impairment (and
with it, the social model of disability informing much critical disability

129. Shelley Tremain, "Foucault, Governmentality, and Critical Disability Theory: An Introduction"
in Shelley Tremain, ed, Foucault and the Government of Disability (Ann Arbor: University of

Michigan Press, 2005) 1 [Tremain, "Foucault, Governmentality, Critical Disability Theory"]. See also
Shelley Tremain, "On the Government of Disability: Foucault, Power, and the Subject of Impairment"
in Lennard J Davis, ed, The DisabilityStudies Reader, 2nd ed (New York: Routledge, 2006) 185.
130. Tremain, "Foucault, Governmentality, Critical Disability Theory," supra note 129 at 10.
131. Ibid.
132. See Diamond, "Building Solidarity," supra note 25 at 72.
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scholarship).133 Specifically, she redeploys Foucault and Butler to argue
for the reversibility of dominant categories of discourse, and so the ability
of the oppressed to reclaim the language or concepts through which their
oppression is partially enacted (in "a reworking of abjection into political
agency").1 3 4 Tus Mollow observes:
Tremain does not explore the possibility... that the production of specific
impairment categories might have multiple, competing effects, including,
paradoxically, the contestation of assumptions on which these categories
are based.'35
In this vein, Mollow, drawing on Foucault, asserts that just as
psychiatric discourse "brought into being the 'homosexual,"' thereby
producing both "the strong advancement of social controls" and a resistant
politics or reverse discourse, so the manifold other "disease entities" of
contemporary psychiatry and other medical disciplines are subject to
reversal or subversion.1 3 6 This is of course the premise of Mad Pride.
Mollow elaborates through a close reading of Meri Nana-Ama
Danquah's Willow Weep for Me: A Black Woman & Journey through
137
Depression.
She notes that "Danquah's autopathography... depends on
biomedicine's construction of depression as a disease entity." 13 8 One might
say Danquah gives voice to Stefan's class ofthe "discreditable" in narrating
her struggle to have her experience of deep mental anguish recognized
as a "legitimate illness," and so to be vindicated as neither a "flake" nor
a "fraud."13 9 Along the way, Danquah does battle with racist stereotypes
operating to invisibilize black women's depression. On Mollow's
reading, Danquah's anchoring her narrative in a claim to legitimate
illness "resists the normalizing effects" of biopower, instead operating
to expose the "imbrication of her illness with political oppression."140 In
effect, Danquah's text performs an intersectionality analysis of the social

133. Anna Mollow, "'When Black Women Start Going on Prozac': Race, Gender, and Mental Illness
in Meri Nana-Ama Danquah's Willow Weep for Me" in Lennard J Davis, ed, The DisabilityStudies

Reader, 4th ed (New York: Routledge, 2013) 411.
134. Ibid at 422, quoting Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"

(London: Routledge, 1993) at 21.
135. Mollow, supra note 133 at 420.
136. Ibid, citing Michel Foucault, The History ofSexuality, Volume I: An Introduction, translated by

Robert Burley (New York: Random House, 1978) at 101-103.
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137. Meri Nana-Ama Danquah, Willow Weep for Me: A Black Woman Journey through Depression

(New York: Random House, 1999).
138. Mollow, supra note 133 at 420.
139. Ibid, citing Danquah, supra note 137 at 144.
140. Mollow, supra note 133 at 420.
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structural forces converging around disability, race, and gender to produce
a unique form of oppression."'
Yet even as Mollow raises arguments in defense of personal and social
movement strategies complicating the divide between embeddedness
in and resistance to psychiatry, a residual concern is conveyed in a
footnote to her text (itself a kind of "dangerous supplement" or site of
critical reversal).1 4 2 There Mollow relates that Danquah's book includes a
supplement in which the author is interviewed "by the Director of the Lilly
Center for Women's Health, which is part of Eli Lilly, the pharmaceutical
company that manufactures Prozac."1 4 3 Mollow further reveals that
Danquah has "given book tours in conjunction with the National Mental
Health Association Campaign on Clinical Depression, which is funded
by Eli Lilly."' Mollow takes a few lines to rise to Danquah's defense,
arguing that she is clearly not "biased" in favour of Pharma, as her
narrative focuses more on the cultural and political dimensions of her
experience than on psychoactive treatments; moreover, Mollow notes,
Danquah expresses concern and ambivalence about medications-giving
some prominence, for instance, to her experience of negative side effects
of (Eli Lilly's competition, Pfizer's) Zoloft. Yet it is difficult to wholly put
away the concern that Danquah's important work exposing the cultural
forces operating to invisibilize black women's depression has been
in a significant sense captured or harvested by Pharma according to its
unwavering logic of profit, in an effort to colonize the hearts and minds
of an underdeveloped market-as such, to bring depressed black women
"out of the shadows" and into the psychopharmacological economy.
The result is to compromise the force of Mollow's arguments on the
power of reversibility in this field, or at least to situate her nuanced analysis
of Danquah's text in light of a wider view of who is occupying the fieldin particular Pharma, obviously highly expert and staggeringly resourced
when it comes to enacting what might be termed reverse-reversibility.
Despite this, I suggest that Mollow's rejoinders to Tremain continue
to resonate, particularly on the problematic normative and political
implications of the radical critique of "impairment" in delegitimizing the
complex and deeply-felt lived experience of one such as Danquah, her
hard-won activation of agency (or of the experience of agency-is there a
difference?) amidst a set of interlocking socioeconomic barriers.
141. See Tara Earl, David Williams & Stacey Anglade, "An Update on the Mental Health of Black
Americans: Puzzling Dilemmas and Needed Research" (2011) 37:4 J Black Psychology 485.
142. Mollow, supra note 133 at 425, n 13.
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid.
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3. Agonizing identity
To close off these reflections on the possibilities following from our
(spectral) capacity for critical reflection on our own and others' mental
health identities, I turn more directly to what it might mean to activate a
post-identity politics across the complex and contested field of psychiatric
subjectification. Or if not strictly a post-identity politics, then a radically
agonistic democratic politics. Here I look to Shaindl Diamond on the
potential for heightened attentiveness to inter- and intra-group pluralism
among radicalized psy-subjects, and to Bonnie Burstow and others on
expanding the politics of psy-critique beyond identity-based limits to
admit a range of critical interlocutors crossing the expert/lived experience

divide.
a. Identity politics is a plural
Shaindl Diamond draws on her critical ethnographic work in Toronto to
observe that those who stand back from Mad-identified activism despite
having experienced mental health interventions as violence include
persons whose prior or more fundamental political allegiances are built
around race, gender, sexual identity, class, or other forms of political
identity.' In the radical projects and insights of these oppositional
subjects, psychiatric power may be regarded as interacting with a wider set
of power relationships in ways that cannot be disentangled; however, the
forces productive of psychiatric subjectification or "mental disability" are
not experienced as activating a discrete form or strand of political identity

or solidarity.146
Diamond builds on this observation to urge attentiveness, within
the movement of resistance to coercive psychiatry, to the potential that
framing madness as a master identity may flatten or render invisible other
dimensions of institutional and social structural power dynamics in and
beyond the domain of psychiatry or mental health. The result, she suggests,
may be to impair the movement's capacity for critical engagement with
the structural roots of oppression beyond the state-psychiatric apparatus.14 7
In this, Diamond is not so much counseling a severing of political
aspirations from the construct(s) of shared identity as advising sensitivity
to the homogenizing effects that identity-based politics-even a politics
of Mad identity-can produce. Correspondingly, she argues that other
identity-based movements must attend to their own propensity to assert
a master status and so to flatten or silence intra-group experiences of
145. Diamond, "Building Solidarity," supra note 25 at 69, 71, 73-74.
146. Ibid at 69.
147. Ibid at 71, 75.
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psychiatrization-or even more problematically, to ground bids for
recognition or equal rights in strategies of constitutive exclusion that
reproduce the abject status of the Mad.'
Taken together, these messages point toward a project of mutual
consciousness-raising among activists and social movements in recognition
of the interpenetration of conceptual, institutional, and social structural
forces to produce multi-textured forms of oppression. Diamond joins with
others, such as veteran Mad scholar and activist Lilith Finklerl49 and a
growing cadre of activists and scholars concerned with the interaction of
psychiatrization, racism, and colonialism,5 0 to call for increased attention to
complex and multiple "oppressive practices"-including "sexism, racism,
ablism, classism, adultism, misogyny, transphobia, and heterosexism"putting "people at greater risk of violence and marginality" within and
beyond the psychiatric system."11 Diamond suggests that promoting the
critique of psychiatric oppression through engagement with other identitybased social movements may generate greater sensitivity to how this
form of oppression interacts with and reinforces others, and serve as a
bridge-building mechanism among and within plural identity-based social
movements.
This is not as such a post-identity politics, but a vision of what it
would mean to move beyond fractious and fragmenting identity politics.
In its attention to both intra-group and extra-group pluralism, Diamond's
analysis recalls Chantal Mouffe's "agonistic pluralism," introduced

148. Ibid at 75, and see Shaindl Diamond, "Feminist Resistance against the Medicalization of
Humanity: Integrating Knowledge about Psychiatric Oppression and Marginalized People" in
Burstow, LeFranqois & Diamond, supra note 37, 194 at 199-203.
149. See Lilith Finkler, "Mad Pride: A Movement for Social Change," The Consumer/Survivor
InformationResource Centre of Toronto Bulletin, bulletin 398 (15 July 2009) 1, online: <www.csinfo.

ca/bulletin/Bulletin_398.pdf>. In an essay marking Mad Pride Day in Toronto in 2009, Finkler argues
that as Mad Pride establishes its own culture of solidarity, it will be further strengthened by alliances
with anti-poverty groups and other anti-oppression activists:
For example, we can work with Black organizations to address community policing, since
both our communities have suffered in the justice system. We can reach out to members
of the blind community since some psychiatric survivors have blurred vision and need an
alternative to print communication. We canbuild alliances with immigrant advocates. Some
applicants are declared medically inadmissible to Canada. Similarly, if our psychiatric
history is known, we may be refused entry into other countries we wish to visit.
150. See e.g. Louise Tam, "Whither Indigenizing the Mad Movement?: Theorizing the Social
Relations of Race and Madness through Conviviality" in LeFrangois, Menzies & Reaume, Mad
Matters, supranote 25, 281; Ruby Dhand, "Colliding Intersections in Law: Culture, Race and Mental
Health" (2011) 2 Annual Rev Interdisciplinary Justice Research 100; Ruby Dhand, "Access to Justice
for Ethno-Racial Psychiatric Consumer/Survivors in Ontario" (2011) 29:1 Windsor YB Access Just
127; China Mills, Decolonizing Global Mental Health: The Psychiatrization of the Majority World

(London: Routledge, 2014).
151. Diamond, "Building Solidarity," supra note 25 at 73.
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earlier as a variant of radical democratic theory advancing the imperative
of opening identity-based social justice claims to ongoing reflection on
constitutive exclusion.152 And yet Diamond's approach is not wholly
rooted in agonism, if this is taken to mean infinite iterations of we/they.
It is also, indeed arguably more fundamentally, rooted in an ethic of
"empathy and understanding across difference."153 That is, while Diamond
acknowledges "the significance of different experiences, understandings,
roles, and access to privilege among differently situated communities,"
she emphasizes the importance of exploring "ways of fostering empathy
and understanding across difference that are useful in attempts to develop
analysis and strategy that account for different (partial) truths emerging
from a multiplicity of standpoints.""'
Perhaps most importantly-in terms of what it means to, if not wholly
de-materialize identity in and beyond contemporary mental health politics,
then to ameliorate identity's most corrosive aspects-Diamond suggests
that the mere collation of standpoints is not enough to build a radically
pluralist politics. Rather, it is necessary (in order to bridge agonism and
empathy on the way to pluralist solidarity) "to subject each experience
or perspective to a process of critical interpretation and theorization,
taking into consideration its historical and material basis, before it can
become part of the foundation for solidarity and struggle.""' This is an
important gesture beyond identity even as the base of identity politics is
retained: a commitment to building solidarity not around a pre-defined
identity or experience, but instead, around a shared commitment to critical
interpretation and theorization of one's own and others' positions. In this
way, unanticipated perspectives or experiences, viewed in light of their
historical and material basis, may be determined to fit with or enrich
the (shifting) normative commitments of political movements viewed
independently and in coalition.
I consider Diamond's work situating Mad identity politics within a
wider field of radical social movement coalition politics to be exemplary
of the work of agonizing identity. The effect is to endorse a Mad or
Mad-curious pluralism, wherein the desire for social justice is conveyed
in part as a desire to go, or to be taken, beyond one's (identity-based or
experiential) limits.

152.
153.
154.
155.

Mouffe, supra note 5.
Diamond, "Building Solidarity," supra note 25 at 73.
Ibid.
Ibid at 75.
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b. Cracking open Mad Studies
A second and final insight into the latent potency of spectral identity
arises in connection with the self-consciously new (yet, at the same time,
historically and politically grounded) school of inquiry already referenced
herein: Mad Studies. Some background is provided by Bonnie Burstow
and Brenda LeFrangois in the introduction to their recent co-edited
156
collection, PsychiatryDisrupted.
There the authors recall the historical
and ongoing importance of identity politics for the social movement
formed around resistance to coercive psychiatry:
The need to keep "other" theorists with "other" identities (or those who
refuse to identify) at bay may be most keenly felt by people who openly
identify as psychiatric survivors, mad, or "service users." People who
identify as such often do not want sane-identified people theorizing or
engaging in activism on their behalf. This is understandable given the
history of hann, domination, and co-optation by seemingly like-minded
radical therapists and academics who have benefitted from inequitable
alliances with psychiatrized people over the past half century. . . Indeed,
there are times in every movement, and there are times in the lives of
oppressed people, where it becomes important to keep people who do
not share that oppressed identity at bay.1 7
Yet Burstow and LeFrangois raise concerns about identity politics
taken as the central organizing principle of radical opposition to
psychiatric-state coercion. The authors are careful to "underscore how
critical the psychiatric survivor voice is in engaging in a psychiatric
survivor analysis.""' However, they add:
identity politics alone will not win this fight. . . While honouring the
enormous importance of madness-related identity politics, accordingly,
we theorize resistance against psychiatry as we would any other
(r)evolution: something that demands the attention of all who are critical
and where everyone has a role to play."'
Thus the authors propose an enhanced orientation to critique
proceeding from multiple sites and along multiple lines of inquiry, in part
through a reinvigorated relationship between activists and the academy:
Neither is it tenable to artificially create dichotomies and divisions
between activists and academics, between the openly psychiatrized and

156. Bonnie Burstow & Brenda A LeFrangois, "Impassioned Praxis: An Introduction to Theorizing
Resistance to Psychiatry" in Burstow, LeFrangois & Diamond, supra note 37, 3.
157. Ibid at 4-5.
158. Ibid at 5 [reference omitted].
159. Ibid.
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those who may refuse classification of their experiences or those who
have escaped psychiatrization. The point is, given that we are all at risk
of psychiatrization, we cannot afford to exclude the work and theorizing
of anyone engaging in radical or mad activist scholarship, if we are to

succeed. 160
Diamond, Burstow, LeFrangois, and others (including Erick Fabris)
have in recent years come together to formally constitute such a community
of enlarged mentality under the banner of Mad Studies. They have brought
into the fold a range of activists and academics, some who identify as Mad
or as having lived experience of oppression within the psychiatric/mental
health system, and some who do not. Mad Studies is described as
an umbrella term that is used to embrace the body of knowledge that
has emerged from psychiatric survivors, Mad-identified people,
antipsychiatry academics and activists, critical psychiatrists, and radical
therapists. This body of knowledge is wide-ranging and includes
scholarship that is critical of the mental health system as well as radical
and mad activist scholarship. This field of study is informed by and
generated by the perspectives of psychiatric survivors and Mad-identified
researchers and academics.161

Here and in other accounts, Mad Studies is rooted in the historical and
political location of those who have experienced radicalization through
encounter with the mental health system. As the editors ofMadMatters: a
CriticalReader in CanadianMad Studies state in their introduction:
[W]ithout the foundation of critical knowledge and action built up over
many years through the grassroots advocacy of psychiatrized people, a
viable field of Mad Studies would be unimaginable. In Canadian Mad
Studies, the political values, canonical texts, methodologies, forms of
communication, and blueprints for action-not to mention the heroes
of the movement-have all emerged, in various ways, from survivor
culture and history.1 62

However, the historical and ongoing participants in this deliberative
arena also include a range of allies otherwise coded as experts (critical
psy-professionals and academics). This dimension of Mad Studies speaks
to the possibility of spectral identity, or to the inchoate foundations of
personal and collective identity on the way to a strengthened politics of

&

160. Ibid.
161. "Glossary of Terms" inLeFrangois, Menzies & Reaume, supranote 25, 334 at 337. See also the
identification of emerging themes in Mad Studies in the editors' introduction: Menzies, LeFrangois
Reaume, "Introducing Mad Studies," supra note 53 at 13-18.
162. Menzies, LeFrangois & Reaume, "Introducing Mad Studies," supra note 53 at 14 [references
omitted].

Agonizing Identity in Mental Health Law and Policy (Part II):
A Political Taxonomy of Psychiatric Subjectification

191

resistance. As such, Mad Studies evinces the capacity of the radical social
movement in resistance to state-psychiatric oppression to reach beyond
settled psy-identities to a range of experiential and normative bases of
critique.
This model of activist/academic, identified/non-identified interlocutors coming together to engage in critical inquiry complements
Diamond's articulation of an intersectional, coalitional politics pursuing
new strategies for countering oppression in and beyond the mental health
system. Neither model is likely to wholly transcend the politics of identity
or render irrelevant the forms and processes of political identification
through which individuals and groups may come to adopt a shared set
of social justice commitments. Indeed, it would be absurd to suggest that
a movement that has its origins in intense and localized experiences of
epistemic and physical violence should forgo the politics through which
such experiences are transformed into a collective purpose. Thus claims
to identity-based or experiential standpoints will likely continue to raise
tensions around who can speak forthe group, who is alegitimate interlocutor,
and when the direction taken in inquiry or discussion is intolerable or
offensive. However, the models of social movement pluralism advanced
here nonetheless express a commitment to interrogating the moves of
constitutive exclusion, including those that may be instantiated in the
claims to subjugated knowledge giving rise to this politics.
What is common to Diamond's account of coalition-building across
difference and the recent efforts to crack open the discursive spaces of Mad
Studies, then, is a simultaneous endorsement of the value of standpoint
and acknowledgment that every standpoint is partial-a commitment to
keep listening for constitutive silence. It is just this emphasis on exploring
the historical and material bases of claims that may test or complicate
one's political commitments that creates the conditions for what I have
called spectral identity. This is to locate the deliberative-agonistic sources
of our capacity for a politics beyond the politics of friend and enemy, or
for self-alienating critique in the company of other minds.
Conclusion
Part I of this essay concluded with my reflections on a felt discordance
between the complex and shifting symbolic and relational bases of my
subjectively perceived self-constitution and the putative strict binaries of
reason and madness. I suggested that such autoethnographic inquiry may
inform the radically emancipatory work of agonistic pluralism: the work
of bridging one's critical insights and aspirations with those of others in an
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effort to reconstitute (to disrupt, to reimagine, to mad) identity along with
mental health law and policy.
In Part II, I have inquired into the varieties of political subject
positions marking mental health politics-specifically, those amenable
to characterization as directly affected by the coordinate medico-legal
domain of mental health law and policy. I have suggested that there is no
simple answer to the question: Is mental health identity getting in the way
of social justice? This question engages the concern that mental health has
increasingly come to inform the politics of need, risk, and harm in ways
that individuate and moreover medicalize the social body, so depleting our
capacities to discern the complex roots of, and to devise deep systemic
responses to, social injustice. Moreover, the question engages critiques of
identity politics-as potentially reifying subordinated identity categories,
in addition to obstructing critical analysis and coalition-building across the
wider social structural fields in which group-based oppression is located.
Yet to counsel a wholesale shift from the politics of mental health to a postidentity politics would miss the rootedness of this politics in localized sites
of power and solidarity. And in any case, the social justice implications of
politicized identity necessarily differ across different sites, in and beyond
the politics of mental health.
That said, I have suggested, building on the work of Susan Stefan, that
this politics might be refreshed and its radical potential strengthened by
way of an anti-identitarian ethic of resistance to epistemic violence-or
more radically still, an ethic of resistance (tentative and episodic as it may
be) to framing social justice problems in the discourse of mental health.
These suggestions find some support in work of Shaindl Diamond, Bonnie
Burstow, and others promoting intensified exploration of inter- and intragroup pluralism in and beyond the class(es) of radical psy-subjects. Such
proposals turn upon our shared capacity to enter into what I have termed
spectral identity, moments in which we call our personal and political
identities into question and reflect on our habits of constitutive exclusion
in light of alternative modes of identification and action.
Thus while it is impossible to simply undo the intricate interpellation
of the self with psychiatry and political economy, or as such to shear that
part of the bio-psycho-social complex that produces "mental health" away
from our personal and political lives, it is possible to endorse vigilant
and persistent interrogation of the forms of identity and difference we
construct and reconstruct along these lines. What would be the effect of
activating such agonistic deliberative spaces? We might find that there
are more possibilities in our laws and in ourselves than we had thought.
Perhaps we would be moved to take more seriously such proposals as
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the repeal of involuntary psychiatric hospitalization and treatment laws in
favour of a continuum of voluntary, responsive supports, respectful and
welcoming of diversity. Perhaps we would recognize that we are ourselves
unstably positioned along a continuum of material and psycho-social
vulnerabilities. In any case, the ambition of agonizing identity in mental
health law and policy is not to abruptly unseat all of the identity-based
distinctions constituting this field, but rather to spur renewed inquiry into
the legitimacy of these distinctions.
In sum, I conclude, with Diamond, Burstow, and others engaged in Mad
Studies, that we should forge new, Mad-pluralist discursive and institutional
spaces wherein we may place in issue the norms and aspirations in which
we ground our laws and policies, in and beyond the politics of mental
health. Again, the point is not to suddenly wholly transcend the conceptual
apparatus of "mental health," but to reflect critically and from a plurality
of perspectives on how the dichotomy of reason and madness, the deep
logic of othering, is expressed in our political and legal institutions-and
in ourselves. For it remains that, whether we stand at the white hot radical
core of psy-resistance or in the cool spaces of mental health consumerism,
we ourselves are at the heart of the puzzle with which I began: the puzzle,
framed as emancipatory imperative, of undertaking the critical ontology of
ourselves in the thick of biopower.

